Iran, major powers reach historic nuclear deal

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Iranian Fareign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (2nd L), High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini (L), Iranian ambassador to IAEA Ali Akbar Salehi (2nd R) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (R) Vienna, Austria 14 July, 2015. (Reuters)

By Staff writer | Al Arabiya News
Tuesday, 14 July 2015

Major world powers and Iran have formally concluded a historic deal aimed at ensuring that Iran does not obtain the nuclear bomb, the EU's foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini announced Tuesday.

"Iran Talks done. We have the agreement," she said in a tweet, shortly after a final plenary session of foreign ministers from the so-called P5+1 and Iran ended in Vienna.

Iranian President Hassan Rowhani said the nuclear deal will open "new horizons" now that "this unnecessary crisis" has been resolved.

In a message on his Twitter account, Rowhani said the successful talks had shown "constructive engagement works."

There can now be "a focus on shared challenges", he added. Iran's foreign minister hailed the nuclear accord with world powers as "a historic moment" but acknowledged the deal was "not perfect".

"I believe this is a historic moment. We are reaching an agreement that is not perfect for anybody but it is what we could accomplish and it is an important achievement for all of us," Mohammad Javad Zarif said at a final ministerial meeting between Iran and six world powers in Vienna.

Iran and major powers agreed on a mechanism under which the U.N. nuclear watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency could get access to suspect nuclear sites in Iran within 24 days, the text of the Iran nuclear agreement said.

Iran will also be allowed to conduct research and development (R&D) with uranium for advanced centrifuges during the first 10 years of a nuclear agreement with major powers, according to the text of the deal posted on the Russian foreign ministry website.

"Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium," the text of the agreement said.

Nuclear inspections
The deal is said to allow U.N. inspectors to press for visits to Iran’s military sites as part of their monitoring duties – a compromise between Washington and Tehran. Iranian media rejected such a demand earlier today.

"All the hard work has paid off and we sealed a deal. God bless our people," one diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity. A second Iranian official confirmed the agreement.

But access at will to any site would not necessarily be granted and even if so, could be delayed, a condition that critics of the deal are sure to seize on as possibly giving Tehran time to cover any sign of non-compliance with its commitments.

Under the deal, Tehran would have the right to challenge the U.N request and an arbitration board composed of Iran and the six world powers that negotiated with it would have to decide on the issue.

Still, such an arrangement would be a notable departure from assertions by top Iranian officials that their country would never allow the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency into such sites. Iran has argued that such visits by the IAEA would be a cover for spying on its military secrets.

The foreign ministers of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States met for about an hour just after midnight as they struggled to complete the agreement, which has been under negotiation for more than 20 months.

Any deal will go to the U.N. Security Council, which is expected to endorse it by the end of the month, to start the mechanics of implementation - long-term, verifiable limits on Iranian nuclear programs that could be used to make weapons in exchange for an end to sanctions on the Islamic Republic.

Details
Tehran and the six powers have been holding marathon diplomatic negotiations at the ministerial level for more than two weeks to resolve a 12-year stand-off over Iran's nuclear program.

A draft nuclear deal between Iran and six major powers calls for U.N. inspectors to have access to all suspect Iranian sites, including military, based on consultations between the powers and Tehran, a diplomatic source told Reuters earlier today.

The source also said that if the deal is accepted, a U.N. Security Council resolution on it would ideally be adopted this month and the steps to be taken by both sides - including Iranian limitations on its nuclear program and relief from sanctions on Iran - would be implemented in the first half of 2016.

The details of the draft deal, which is still being negotiated, are broadly in line with an interim agreement clinched on April 2 in Lausanne, Switzerland.

But as negotiations reached a critical stage, new details emerged, and it was significant that the latest draft included inspections for military sites, access to experts and a proposed timeline for putting a possible deal in place.

The information from the source was preliminary and subject to change because it was based on a draft of the nuclear deal that was not the final version and that could be amended before final approval by Iran and the six powers.

Diplomats close to the talks say that they are hoping to approve a final version of the draft document as early as Tuesday. Negotiations were continuing in the early hours of Tuesday to reach an agreement, the diplomats said.

The source said that Iran and the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency have agreed on a plan to address outstanding questions about the possible military dimensions of past Iranian nuclear activity by the end of this year, adding that some sanctions relief would be conditioned on Tehran resolving this issue.

The plan agreed by the IAEA and Iran includes one visit to the Parchin military site as well as possible interviews with Iranian nuclear scientists, the source noted.

Nuclear negotiations between Tehran and six world powers missed a midnight deadline on Monday to reach a final deal, but diplomats from all sides said they hoped for a breakthrough in the coming hours.

Israeli reaction
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the nuclear deal was "a historic mistake for the world."

"In every area where it was supposed to prevent Iran attaining nuclear arms capability, there were huge compromises," his office quoted him as saying at the start of a meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Bert Koenders.

Netanyahu has long opposed any deal with Iran, and Israel has signalled it could take military action if need be to stop the Islamic republic from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability.

He has taken his campaign to the U.S. Congress and the U.N. General Assembly but ultimately failed to block the deal.

"You can't prevent an agreement when those negotiating it are prepared to make more and more concessions to those shouting 'Death to the United States' even as the talks are in progress," Netanyahu said on Tuesday.

"Iran will get hundreds of billions of dollars with which it will be able to fuel its terror machine," he said, referring to the expected lifting of crippling Western sanctions on its oil and banking sectors.

Meanwhile, Israel's deputy foreign minister accused Western powers of surrendering to Iran.

"This deal is a historic surrender by the West to the axis of evil headed by Iran," Tzipi Hotovely said in a message on Twitter, the first reaction from a senior Israeli official to a deal. "Israel will act with all means to try and stop the agreement being ratified."


[With agencies]

Last Update: Tuesday, 14 July 2015 KSA 14:11 - GMT 11:11
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Syria’s Assad praises Iran deal as ‘Great victory’

Syria President Bashar al-Assad addresses reporters following his meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France. (File Photo: AP)

By AFP | Damascus
Tuesday, 14 July 2015

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad congratulated key ally Iran Tuesday on reaching a nuclear deal with world powers, calling the agreement a "great victory".

In a message to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Assad said he was "happy that the Islamic Republic of Iran has achieved a great victory by reaching an agreement", state news agency SANA reported.

"In the name of the Syrian people, I congratulate you and the people of Iran on this historic achievement," he added in another message addressed to President Hassan Rouhani.

Assad said the deal would be a "major turning point in the history of Iran, the region and the world."

He added that it provided "clear recognition on the part of world powers of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, while preserving the national rights of your people and confirming the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

"We are confident Iran will continue, and with greater momentum, to support the peoples' just issues and to work towards establishing peace and stability in the region and the world," Assad said.

Syria's foreign ministry also welcomed the deal, which it said underlined "the importance of adopting diplomacy and political solutions to resolve international disagreements."

Tehran is a longstanding ally of Damascus and has remained so since Syria's uprising began in March 2011.

It has bolstered Assad's government with military and financial support, including a $1 billion (900 million euro) credit line approved by Syria's parliament on July 7.

It is also a key ally of Lebanon's Hezbollah movement, which has dispatched fighters to help Assad's forces battle the uprising.

More than 230,000 people have been killed in Syria since the conflict began with anti-government demonstrations more than four years ago.

Last Update: Tuesday, 14 July 2015 KSA 20:13 - GMT 17:13
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Obama, Rowhani welcome historic nuclear deal

German FM Frank Walter Steinmeier, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, Iranian FM Mohammad Javad Zarif, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. (Reuters)

By Staff writer | Al Arabiya News
Tuesday, 14 July 2015

U.S. President Barack Obama and his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rowhani welcomed Tuesday’s historic agreement between Iran and major world powers that curbs the Islamic republic nuclear program in return for sanctions relief.

In a televised address, Obama said the deal cut off “every pathway” to an Iranian atomic weapon.

“Today, because America negotiated from a position of strength and principle, we have stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in this region,” he said in an address from the White House.

Describing a “difficult history” between Iran and the United States that “cannot be ignored,” Obama said the diplomatic victory also showed “it is possible to change.”

“This deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction. We should seize it,” he said.

As Obama concluded his address – which was aired by Iranian state television – Rowhani began his statement on the diplomatic breakthrough.

The agreement would open a new chapter of cooperation with the outside world after years of sanctions, he said adding the “win-win” result would gradually eliminate mutual mistrust.

Iran would abide by its commitments under the agreement as long as world powers did, Rowhani, seen as a reformer, said.

He asserted the accord protected gains made by Tehran in a nuclear program the West suspects is intended to develop an atomic weapon. Iran says the work is purely peaceful.

Rowhani also urged neighboring countries to ignore what he called propaganda by Israel, saying Iran had a shared interest in the stability of the region.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the agreement a “historic mistake.”

‘Good deal’
Both Secretary of State John Kerry and European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini described the agreement as a “good deal.”

“This is the good deal that we have sought,” Kerry told a news conference after the agreement.

“Today is an historic day,” Mogherini said adding, that was a great honor “for us to announce that we have reached an agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue.”

U.S. national security adviser Susan Rice said the agreement will prevent Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and not let up pressure for its support of terrorism and “other destabilizing activities.”

“This is a very good deal. It cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a nuke and ensures the necessary inspections & transparency,” Rice said on Twitter.

Britain’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, described the deal as historic, saying it “secures our fundamental aim - to keep Iran from developing a nuclear weapon - and that will help to make our world a safer place.”

He said the deal required leadership, courage and determination and that it was time to move forward and put it into place.

Cameron said Iran will reap economic benefits, so long as it delivers on everything it has agreed to do.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says his country is pleased with the result of nuclear negotiations between world powers and Iran.

Speaking to journalists Tuesday in Vienna, Lavrov said Russia and China pushed to end an arms embargo on Iran as soon as possible. However, he said Iranians “agreed to compromise” since “the West insisted that the embargo should stay.”

French President Francois Hollande praised the landmark Iranian nuclear agreement and has called on Iran for help in the Syrian conflict.

Hollande said the deal shows the "world is moving forward" and that "Iran must show that it is ready to help us end the (Syrian) conflict."

Arms race
Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Egypt said it “hopes that the deal between both sides is complete and prevents an arms race in the Middle East as well as ensuring the region is free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.”

The United Arab Emirates welcomed the historic deal saying it could turn a “new page” for the Gulf region.

“Iran could play a (significant) role in the region if it revises its policy and stops interfering in the internal affairs of countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen,” a UAE official said in the first reaction from the Gulf Arab monarchies to the Vienna accord.


Last Update: Tuesday, 14 July 2015 KSA 20:47 - GMT 17:47
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/07/14/Obama-Rowhani-welcome-historic-nuclear-deal.html
 

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Iran nuclear deal could turn 'new page' for Gulf: UAE

The official WAM news agency said UAE leaders have congratulated Iranian President Hassan Rowhani, saying they hope the Vienna accord will “strengthen security and stability in the region.” (AP)

Abu Dhabi, AFP
Tuesday, 14 July 2015

The United Arab Emirates Tuesday welcomed the historic nuclear deal agreed by world powers and Iran, with an official saying it could turn a “new page” for the Gulf region.

“Iran could play a (significant) role in the region if it revises its policy and stops interfering in the internal affairs of countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen,” a UAE official said in the first reaction from the Gulf Arab monarchies to the Vienna accord.

“The new direction we hope to see accompany the historic nuclear deal would demonstrate a genuine desire for Iran to help extinguish fires devouring the region,” the official said.

“This would move the region away from the discord of sectarianism, extremism and terrorism.”

Reached on day 18 of marathon talks in Austria’s capital, the accord is aimed at resolving a 13-year standoff over Iran’s nuclear ambitions after repeated diplomatic failures and threats of military action.

The UAE and the Islamic republic are in dispute over three small Gulf islands occupied by Iran, but the Sunni Muslim emirates still have good business relations with their Shiite neighbor.

Like its Gulf Cooperation Council partners, including Sunni powerhouse Saudi Arabia, the UAE has repeatedly expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Abu Dhabi also fears that the Vienna agreement will strengthen Iranian influence in the region.

A change of path by Tehran would send a “positive signal that would help the region avoid nuclear proliferation and all the risks this would involve for its security and stability,” the Emirati official said.

“Without such a change, we cannot build anything positive, and this will have consequences on the region and its people.”

The official WAM news agency said UAE leaders have congratulated Iranian President Hassan Rowhani, saying they hope the Vienna accord will “strengthen security and stability in the region.”

Last Update: Tuesday, 14 July 2015 KSA 20:48 - GMT 17:48
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/07/14/Iran-nuclear-deal-could-turn-new-page-for-Gulf-UAE.html
 

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Israel blasts Iran deal as ‘one of the darkest days in history’



Reaction to the Iran deal and scenes from the final negotiations


The historic pact to limit Iran’s nuclear program will end economic sanctions in the nation.
By William Booth and Ruth Eglash July 14 at 6:49 AM

JERUSALEM -- Israeli leaders across the political spectrum condemned in stark apocalyptic language the Iranian nuclear pact announced by the United States and world powers Tuesday, calling it a historic mistake that frees Iran to sponsor global terror while assembling the information and materials to build a nuclear weapon.

“Iran is going to receive a sure path to nuclear weapons,” said Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Tuesday. “Many of the restrictions that were supposed to prevent it from getting there will be lifted.”

With the lifting of economic sanctions, Netanyahu warned, “Iran will get a jackpot, a cash bonanza of hundreds of billions of dollars, which will enable it to continue to pursue its aggression and terror.”

Netanyahu’s hardline coalition partner, education minister Naftali Bennett said, “Today a terrorist nuclear superpower is born, and it will go down as one of the darkest days in world history.”



Netanyahu’s fellow Likud member, the Science Minister Danny Danon, said the Iran pact “is like providing a pyromaniac with matches.”

Many Israeli leaders view a nuclear Iran as an existential threat to their state.

Israeli social media accounts were filled with images of former British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who pushed a policy of appeasement toward Adolf Hitler and the Nazis on the eve of World War II.

Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders blasted the deal even as negotiators in Vienna were still making the announcement and providing the first details of the deal.

“Israel will defend itself,” Bennett warned, vowing that military action is still an option for the Jewish State, which feels itself in the crosshairs from a belligerent enemy, where just last week protesters in Tehran were chanting “Death to Israel!”

Three years ago, Israelis were debating at the highest levels whether it might be necessary for Israel or the United States, or both countries, to launch aerial strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Even as Israel reasserts its rights to act independently and hit Iran if threatened, a unilateral Israeli strike is not more likely today, Israeli defense analysts say, because the United States is committed to making the Iran pact work and Israel is not likely to act alone.

Iran: Deal is ‘not perfect’ but ‘important’(2:01)
Iran and six major powers have reached a landmark deal to curb Tehran’s nuclear program. Iran's Foreign Secretary says it represents a new chapter of hope. (Reuters)
[How the agreement works]

“It goes without saying that an agreement prevents Israel from thinking about a military option, unlike the options that might have existed five or ten ago,” said Uzi Rabi, director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University.

On the eve of the signing of the accord, Netanyahu warned on his Twitter account that Iran “is more dangerous than ISIS,” the Islamic State radicals who have captured vast swathes of Syria and Iraq and “the true goal of this aggression ... is to take over the world.”

“The only thing Netanyahu has left is to continue talking,” said Yoel Guzansky, former head of the Iran desk at Israel’s National Security Council.

Israeli politicians and pro-Israel supporters in the United States will now likely press Congress to derail the deal, a difficult prospect that could eventually require trying to override a presidential veto, which would require deep Democratic support.

“The State of Israel will employ all diplomatic means to prevent confirmation of the agreement,” said Israel’s top foreign diplomat, Deputy ForeignMinister Tzipi Hotovely.

U.S. and European diplomats have said that Netanyahu has failed to accept that it is better to stall, observe and roll back Iranian nuclear capabilities than double down on economic sanctions and isolation.

Iran has repeatedly said its aims are peaceful and that developing nuclear power and medicine are its right as a sovereign nation.

Opposition leaders were united in condemning the Iran deal, but they also called its signing a major diplomatic failure for Netanyahu, who has spent his years as Israeli premier warning about the “existential threat” posed by a Islamic Republic against Israel, which itself possesses an unknown number of nuclear weapons.

Speaking Tuesday morning on Israel Radio, Efraim Halevy, former head of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, was critical of the way Israel’s prime minister fought the deal by directly confronting Obama.

[ Full text of the Iran nuclear deal ]

Efraim said that perhaps it would have been better for Israel to apply pressure through more discreet channels and have more of a role in the deal eventually reached.

Yair Lapid, a top opposition figure and leader of an Israeli political party, said there is “no daylight” between Israelis in condemning the Iran deal. But he said Netanyahu bungled the diplomacy. He said, however, that he would be among those Israeli leaders going to Congress to try to convince Israel's friends in both parties to oppose the Iran pact. “This is not about taking sides,” Lapid said. “To speak your mind is never a bad thing.”

In an interview with Israel’s Army Radio, main opposition leaders Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni both criticized Netanyahu for allowing the deal to be reached.

“If you go to a deal, as bad as it may be, the way to minimize its damage is by arriving at an agreement with the US on a very significant security package,” said Herzog.

Netanyahu and his government charge that Obama especially, is naive about Iranian intentions and has placed a foolish bet on a deceptive and devious partner.

Netanyahu uses every opportunity to cut through Iranian disclaimers that their nuclear program is peaceful and designed to develop medicines and energy.

The United States is Israel’s closest and sometimes only ally in the world, supplying diplomatic cover and billions of dollars in military aid over the years, including some of the most sophisticated U.S. arms technology.

But Netanyahu took the extraordinary step of siding with Congressional Republicans and directly and publicly confronting the American president in Congress during a speech in March.

Israeli opposition leaders say that Netanyahu and his circle have helped create the worst relations between Jerusalem and Washington in years with the two leaders and their proxies openly taunting and insulting each other.

Israel blasts Iran deal as ‘one of the darkest days in history’ - The Washington Post
 
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All this decades of misery, more 100's of billions of dollars etc. wasted on basically nothing. (*_-)


Iran Nuclear Deal Full text - July 14, 2015 (Download link PDF)



Quote :


NUCLEAR

A. ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES


1. Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium

enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain

limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8

years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next

stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described

in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its

own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of

the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Safeguards

Agreement.


2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period,

Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed

uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and

enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA

continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.


3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not

accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years

will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and

Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of

uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8

centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges

after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.


4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or

assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace

failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture

advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA.

From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to

manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without

rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA

continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment

and enrichment R&D plan.


5. Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium

enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the

Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%,

and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment

R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.


6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology

centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint

partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1

centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these

cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through

appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other

four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other

centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored

under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.


7. During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international

qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium

stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or

the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold

based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return

for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural

uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or

other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted against the

above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with

regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran,

including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting

international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. All

remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated

into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any additional fuel needed for

the TRR will be made available to Iran at international market prices.


B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING


8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in

Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in

a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The

reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for

medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will

not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the

activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the

redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be

shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership

will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may

be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as

the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day,

conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed

by the E3/EU+3 participants.


9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological

advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors

with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of supply of

necessary fuel.


10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy

water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for

export to the international market.


11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and

research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in

relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.


12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any

spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel

reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel

reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed

exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from

irradiated enriched uranium targets.


C. TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES


13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament),

Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive

Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional

Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex

V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to

its Safeguards Agreement.


14. Iran will fully implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present

Outstanding Issues" agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address

past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised

in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full

implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be

completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will

provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past

and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their

capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the

Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue,

without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.


15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary

measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency

measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a

long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate

produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years;

containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use

of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line

enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to

ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in

Annex I.


16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could

contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium

or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.


17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this

JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.



...
 
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Continue 1 :
Annex I – Nuclear-related measures


A. GENERAL


1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified

in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise

specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.


B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR


2. Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear

research and radioisotopes production for medical and industrial purposes. Iran will

redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached

to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and

purposes, including testing of fuel pins and assembly prototypes and structural

materials. The design will be such as to minimise the production of plutonium and not to

produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation. The power of the redesigned

reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that

the parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary

adjustments in developing the final design while fully preserving the above-mentioned

purposes and principles of modernisation.


3. Iran will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original

design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in Iran. The calandria will be

made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the

IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application. In redesigning

and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will

maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research

reactor.


4. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have

responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project, with

E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities regarding the modernisation of the Arak

reactor as described in this Annex. A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3

participants will be established to facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the

reactor. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would

implement the Arak modernisation project. The Working Group could be enlarged to

include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and

Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their

strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation

Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would

define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, and subsequently

contracts would be concluded. The participants of the Working Group will provide

assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with

their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely

construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.


5. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the

modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by

Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor

can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and

operation. The final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary

laboratories will be submitted to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will aim

to complete its review and endorsement within three months after the submission of the

final design. If the Joint Commission does not complete its review and endorsement

within three months, Iran could raise the issue through the dispute resolution

mechanism envisaged by this JCPOA.


6. The IAEA will monitor the construction and report to the Working Group for

confirmation that the construction of the modernised reactor is consistent with the

approved final design.


7. As the project manager, Iran will take responsibility for the construction efforts.

E3/EU+3 parties will, consistent with their national laws, take appropriate administrative,

legal, technical, and regulatory measures to support co-operation.

E3/EU+3 parties will support the purchase by Iran, the transfer and supply of

necessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems and

technologies required for the construction of the redesigned reactor, through the

mechanism established by this JCPOA, as well as through exploration of relevant

funding contributions.


8. E3/EU+3 parties will also support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the

modernized Arak reactor and its subsidiary laboratories, upon request by Iran, through

IAEA technical cooperation if appropriate, including but not limited to technical and

financial assistance, supply of required materials and equipment, state-of-the-art

instrumentation and control systems and equipment and support for licensing and

authorization.


9. The redesigned reactor will use up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium in the form of UO2

with a mass of approximately 350 kg of UO2 in a full core load, with a fuel design to be

reviewed and approved by the Joint Commission. The international partnership with the

participation of Iran will fabricate the initial fuel core load for the reactor outside

Iran. The international partnership will cooperate with Iran, including through technical

assistance, to fabricate, test and license fuel fabrication capabilities in Iran for

subsequent fuel core reloads for future use with this reactor. Destructive and nondestructive

testing of this fuel including Post-Irradiation-Examination (PIE) will take

place in one of the participating countries outside of Iran and that country will work with

Iran to license the subsequent fuel fabricated in Iran for the use in the redesigned

reactor under IAEA monitoring.


10. Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies, which

are specifically designed for the support of the originally designed Arak reactor,

designated by the IAEA as IR-40. Iran will store under IAEA continuous monitoring all

existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies until the modernised Arak

reactor becomes operational, at which point these natural uranium pellets and IR-40

fuel assemblies will be converted to UNH, or exchanged with an equivalent quantity of

natural uranium. Iran will make the necessary technical modifications to the natural

uranium fuel production process line that was intended to supply fuel for the IR-40

reactor design, such that it can be used for the fabrication of the fuel reloads for the

modernised Arak reactor.


11. All spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of

the reactor, will be shipped out of Iran to a mutually determined location in E3/EU+3

countries or third countries, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in

relevant contracts to be concluded, consistent with national laws, with the recipient

party, within one year from the unloading from the reactor or whenever deemed to be

safe for transfer by the recipient country.


12. Iran will submit the DIQ of the redesigned reactor to the IAEA which will include

information on the planned radio-isotope production and reactor operation programme.

The reactor will be operated under IAEA monitoring.


13. Iran will operate the Fuel Manufacturing Plant only to produce fuel assemblies for light

water reactors and reloads for the modernized Arak reactor.


C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT


14. All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the modernised Arak research

reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quantities needed for medical research

and production of deuterate solutions and chemical compounds including, where

appropriate, contingency stocks, will be made available for export to the international

market based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer for 15

years. Iran's needs, consistent with the parameters above, are estimated to be 130

metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water or its equivalent in different enrichments

prior to commissioning of the modernised Arak research reactor, and 90 metric tonnes

after the commissioning, including the amount contained in the reactor.


15. Iran will inform the IAEA about the inventory and the production of the HWPP and will

allow the IAEA to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of

heavy water produced, including through IAEA visits, as requested, to the HWPP.


D. OTHER REACTORS


16. Consistent with its plan, Iran will keep pace with the trend of international technological

advancement in relying only on light water for its future nuclear power and research

reactors with enhanced international cooperation including assurances of supply of

necessary fuel.


17. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power and

research reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant

contracts to be concluded consistent with national laws with the recipient party.


E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES


18. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel

reprocessing or spent fuel reprocessing R&D activities. For the purpose of this annex,

spent fuel includes all types of irradiated fuel.


19. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, reprocess spent fuel except

for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for medical and

peaceful industrial purposes.


20. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, develop, acquire or build

facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptunium from spent fuel or

from fertile targets, other than for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful

industrial purposes.


21. For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell

or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less

than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of

the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research

reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and

only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and

non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement

mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or

operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded

glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set

out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.


22. The E3/EU+3 are ready to facilitate all of the destructive and non-destructive

examinations on fuel elements and/or fuel assembly prototypes including PIE for all fuel

fabricated in or outside Iran and irradiated in Iran, using their existing facilities outside

Iran. Except for the Arak research reactor complex, Iran will not develop, build, acquire

or operate hot cells capable of performing PIE or seek to acquire equipment to

build/develop such a capability, for 15 years.


23. For 15 years, in addition to continuing current fuel testing activities at the TRR, Iran will

undertake non-destructive post irradiation examination (PIE) of fuel pins, fuel assembly

prototypes and structural materials. These examinations will be exclusively at the Arak

research reactor complex. However, the E3/EU+3 will make available their facilities to

conduct destructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed. The hot cells at the Arak

research reactor in which non-destructive PIE are performed will not be physically

interconnected to cells that process or handle materials for the production of medical or

industrial radioisotopes.


24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals

or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy,

or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.


25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium

(defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for

use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years.

26. If Iran seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed quantities

after 10 years and before 15 years, Iran will present its plan to, and seek approval by,

the Joint Commission.


F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY


27. Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in

no more than 30 cascades in their current configurations in currently operating units at

the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) for 10 years.


28. Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67 percent for 15 years.


29. Iran will remove the following excess centrifuges and infrastructure not associated with

5060 IR-1 centrifuges in FEP, which will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under

IAEA continuous monitoring:


29. All excess centrifuge machines, including IR-2m centrifuges. Excess IR-1 centrifuges

will be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges of the same type on a

one-for-one basis.


29. UF6 pipework including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level,

and frequency inverters, and UF6 withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal

stations, which is currently not in service, including its vacuum pumps and chemical

traps.


30. For the purpose of this Annex, the IAEA will confirm through the established practice

the failed or damaged status of centrifuge machines before removal.


31. For 15 years, Iran will install gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-related

infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium enrichment, research and development, or

stable isotope enrichment, exclusively at the locations and for the activities specified

under this JCPOA.


G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT


32. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate

enriched uranium. For 10 years and consistent with its enrichment R&D plan, Iran's

enrichment R&D with uranium will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges.

Mechanical testing on up to two single centrifuges for each type will be carried out only

on the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7 and IR-8. Iran will build or test, with or

without uranium, only those gas centrifuges specified in this JCPOA.


33. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-2m cascade

at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of

implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these

machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz

in Hall B of FEP.


34. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-4 cascade

at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of

implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these

machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz

in Hall B of FEP.


35. Iran will continue the testing of a single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge

cascade of up to 10 centrifuge machines for 10 years.


36. Iran will test a single IR-5 centrifuge machine for 10 years.


37. Iran will continue testing of the IR-6 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate

cascades and will commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a

half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuge machines

and small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.


38. Iran will commence, upon start of implementation of the JCPOA, testing of the IR-8 on

single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence the

testing of up to 30 centrifuges machines from one and a half years before the end of

year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuges to small cascades to intermediate

cascades in a logical sequence.


39. For 10 years, Iran, consistent with the established practice, will recombine the enriched

and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the use of welded

pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of

enriched and depleted uranium materials and verified by the IAEA.


40. For 15 years, Iran will conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only at the PFEP.

Iran will conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only at the PFEP and the Tehran

Research Centre.


41. For the purpose of adapting PFEP to the R&D activities in the enrichment and

enrichment R&D plan, Iran will remove all centrifuges except those needed for testing as

described in the relevant paragraphs above, except for the IR-1 cascade (No. 1) as

described below. For the full IR-1 cascade (No. 6), Iran will modify associated

infrastructure by removing UF6 pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure

transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters. The IR-1 cascade (No. 1)

centrifuges will be kept but made inoperable, as verified by the IAEA, through the

removal of centrifuge rotors and the injection of epoxy resin into the sub headers,

feeding, product, and tails pipework, and the removal of controls and electrical systems

for vacuum, power and cooling. Excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at

Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. The R&D space in line No. 6

will be left empty until Iran needs to use it for its R&D programme.


42. Consistent with the activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will

maintain the cascade infrastructure for testing of single centrifuges and small and

intermediate cascades in two R&D lines (No. 2 and No. 3) and will adapt two other lines

(No. 4 and No. 5) with infrastructure similar to that for lines No. 2 and No. 3 in order to

enable future R&D activities as specified in this JCPoA. Adaptation will include

modification of all UF6 pipework (including removal of all sub headers except as agreed

as needed for the R&D programme) and associated instrumentation to be compatible

with single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascade testing instead of full scale

testing.


43. Consistent with its plan and internationally established practices, Iran intends to

continue R&D on new types of centrifuges through computer modelling and simulations,

including at universities. For any such project to proceed to a prototype stage for

mechanical testing within 10 years, a full presentation to, and approval by, the Joint

Commission is needed.


H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT


44. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and

technology centre and international collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of

research. The Joint Commission will be informed in advance of the specific projects that

will be undertaken at Fordow.


45. Iran will not conduct any uranium enrichment or any uranium enrichment related R&D

and will have no nuclear material at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) for 15

years.


46. For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines at one wing

of the FFEP of which:


46. Two cascades that have not experienced UF6 before will be modified for the production

of stable isotopes. The transition to stable isotope production of these cascades at

FFEP will be conducted in joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on

the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. To prepare these two cascades

for installation of a new cascade architecture appropriate for stable isotope production

by the joint partnership, Iran will remove the connection to the UF6 feed main header,

and move cascade UF6 pipework (except for the dump line in order to maintain

vacuum) to storage in Fordow under IAEA continuous monitoring. The Joint

Commission will be informed about the conceptual framework of stable isotope

production at FFEP.


46. For four cascades with all associated infrastructure remaining except for pipework that

enables crossover tandem connections, two will be placed in an idle state, not spinning.

The other two cascades will continue to spin until the transition to stable isotope

production described in the previous subparagraph has been completed. Upon

completion of the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous

subparagraph, these two spinning cascades will be placed in an idle state, not

spinning.


47. Iran will:


47. remove the other 2 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges from this wing, by removing all

centrifuges and cascade UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure

transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters.


47. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control

cabinets and vacuum pumps. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be

stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.


48. Iran will:


48. remove all excess centrifuges and uranium enrichment related infrastructure from

the other wing of the FFEP. This will include removal of all centrifuges and UF6

pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure gauges and transducers, and

frequency inverters and converters, and UF6 feed and withdrawal stations.


48. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control

cabinets, vacuum pumps and centrifuge mounting blocks. All these excess centrifuges

and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous

monitoring.


49. Centrifuges from the four idle cascades may be used for the replacement of failed or

damaged centrifuges in stable isotope production at Fordow.


50. Iran will limit its stable isotope production activities with gas centrifuges to the FFEP for

15 years and will use no more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for these activities at the FFEP.

The associated R&D activities in Iran will occur at the FFEP and at Iran's declared and

monitored centrifuge manufacturing facilities for testing, modification and balancing

these IR-1 centrifuges.


51. The IAEA will establish a baseline for the amount of uranium legacy from past

enrichment operations that will remain in Fordow. Iran will permit the IAEA regular

access, including daily as requested by the IAEA, access to the FFEP in order to

monitor Iran's production of stable isotopes and the absence of undeclared nuclear

material and activities at the FFEP for 15 years.


I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT


52. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long term

enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration

described in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol.[1] The IAEA will confirm on an annual

basis, for the duration of the plan that the nature and scope and scale of Iran's

enrichment and enrichment R&D activities are in line with this plan.


53. Iran will start to install necessary infrastructure for the IR-8 at Natanz in Hall B of FEP

after year 10.


54. An agreed template for describing different centrifuge types (IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-

6, IR-6s, IR-7, IR-8) and the associated definitions need to be accomplished by

implementation day.


55. An agreed procedure for measuring IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge performance data

needs to be accomplished by implementation day.



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J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS


56. Iran will maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kg of up to

3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) for

15 years.


57. All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or

the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level

or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return

for natural uranium delivered to Iran. Iran will enter into a commercial contract with an

entity outside Iran for the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in

excess of 300 kg UF6 in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. The E3/EU+3 will

facilitate, where applicable, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. Iran

may choose to seek to sell excess enriched uranium to the IAEA fuel bank in

Kazakhstan when the fuel bank becomes operational.


58. All uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates

for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction,

outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. Scrap oxide and other

forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates will be transferred,

based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of

3.67% or less. In case of future supply of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) for

TRR fuel plates fabrication, all scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be

fabricated into TRR fuel plates, containing uranium enriched to between 5% and 20%,

will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an

enrichment level of 3.67% or less within 6 months of its production. Scrap plates will be

transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside Iran. The commercial

transactions should be structured to return an equivalent amount of natural uranium to

Iran. For 15 years, Iran will not build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or

scrap back to UF6.


59. Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied

reactors in Iran do not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit. Enriched uranium in

fabricated fuel assemblies from other sources outside of Iran for use in Iran's nuclear

research and power reactors, including those which will be fabricated outside of Iran for

the initial fuel load of the modernised Arak research reactor, which are certified by the

fuel supplier and the appropriate Iranian authority to meet international standards, will

not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit. The Joint Commission will establish a

Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while

adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or

the equivalent in different chemical forms). This Technical Working Group will also,

within one year, work to develop objective technical criteria for assessing whether

fabricated fuel and its intermediate products can be readily converted to UF6. Enriched

uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in

Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised

Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided the

Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies

and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6. This could for

instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained

in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to

UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective

technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The

IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that

the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was

approved by the Technical Working Group. The Joint Commission will also support

assistance to Iran including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in

meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran.

60. Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities outside Iran for the

purchase of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate,

as needed, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. In the case of lack of

conclusion of a contract with a fuel supplier, E3/EU+3 will supply a quantity of 19.75%

enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) and deliver to Iran, exclusively for the purpose of

fabrication in Iran of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets for the lifetime of the

reactor. This 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) will be supplied in increments no

greater than approximately 5 kg and each new increment will be provided only when the

previous increment of this material has been verified by the IAEA to have been mixed

with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or fabricated into enriched uranium targets. Iran

will notify the E3/EU+3 within 2 year before the contingency of TRR fuel will be

exhausted in order to have the uranium oxide available 6 months before the end of the 2

year period.


K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING


61. Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will only engage in

production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope separation or

any other centrifuge components, to meet the enrichment and enrichment R&D

requirements of this Annex.


62. Consistent with its plan, Iran will use the stock of IR-1 centrifuge machines in storage,

which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in Natanz and the IR-1

centrifuges installed at Fordow, for the replacement of failed or damaged machines.

Whenever during the 10 year period from the start of the implementation of the JCPOA,

the level of stock of IR-1 machines falls to 500 or below, Iran may maintain this level of

stock by resuming production of IR-1 machines at a rate up to the average monthly

crash rate without exceeding the stock of 500.


63. Consistent with its plan, at the end of year 8, Iran will commence manufacturing of IR-6

and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year 10 at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges

per year for each type. After year 10, Iran will produce complete centrifuges with the

same rate to meet its enrichment and enrichment R&D needs. Iran will store them at

Natanz in an above ground location, under IAEA continuous monitoring, until they are

needed for final assembly according to the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.


L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1


64. Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its

Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol

pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force,

consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament).


65. Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of the

Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards

Agreement remains in force.


M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN


66. Iran will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the “Roadmap

for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues”, as verified by the IAEA in its

regular updates by the Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this

Roadmap.


N. MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA


67. For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, for 15 years

or longer, for the specified verification measures:


67. Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic

seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as

other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally

accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement

recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working

space in individual nuclear sites.


67. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence,

including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear

sites and, with best efforts, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated

IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment.


67. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150

within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally

allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran,

consistent with its laws and regulations.


O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)


68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include

containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate

produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium

conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility

which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period.


69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able

to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore

concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.


P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT


70. For 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including

through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored

centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or

damaged centrifuges, as specified in this Annex.


71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the

IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the FEP and PFEP, for 15

years.


72. For 15 years, the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium

enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D.


73. Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the internationally

established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology. For

15 years, Iran will only engage, including through export of any enrichment or

enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any

foreign entity in enrichment or enrichment related activities, including related research

and development activities, following approval by the Joint Commission.




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A. ACCESS


74. Requests for access pursuant to provisions of this JCPOA will be made in good faith,

with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the minimum necessary

to effectively implement the verification responsibilities under this JCPOA. In line with

normal international safeguards practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering

with Iranian military or other national security activities, but will be exclusively for

resolving concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran's other

non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. The following procedures are for the

purpose of JCPOA implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and are without

prejudice to the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto. In

implementing this procedure as well as other transparency measures, the IAEA will be

requested to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial

secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge.


75. In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, if the IAEA has concerns regarding

undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at

locations that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards agreement

or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and

request clarification.


76. If Iran’s explanations do not resolve the IAEA’s concerns, the Agency may request

access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear

materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations. The

IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant

information.


77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that

enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or

activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given

due and prompt consideration.


78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent

with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative

arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach

satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and

activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14

days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of

the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means

agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of

the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would

advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of

consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not

exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional

days.


B. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY


79. Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on

centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.


80. In this context:


80. Iran will provide the IAEA with an initial inventory of all existing centrifuge rotor tubes

and bellows and subsequent reports on changes in such inventory and will permit the

IAEA to verify the inventory by item counting and numbering, and through containment

and surveillance, of all rotor tubes and bellows, including in all existing and newly

produced centrifuges.


80. Iran will declare all locations and equipment, namely flow-forming machines, filamentwinding

machines and mandrels that are used for production of centrifuge rotor tubes

or bellows, and will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including

through containment and surveillance on this equipment, to verify that this equipment is

being used to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in this JCPOA.


C. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES


81. For 10 years, Iran's uranium isotope separation-related research and development or

production activities will be exclusively based on gaseous centrifuge technology.[2] Iran

will permit IAEA access to verify that uranium isotope separation production and R&D

activities are consistent with this Annex.


T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE


82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development

of a nuclear explosive device:


82. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear

explosive devices.


82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation

systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint

Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.


82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems

(streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the

development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission

for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.


82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron

sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.


Attachment: Arak conceptual design

Fundamental Principles:


• Maximize use of the current infrastructure of original design of Arak research reactor,

designated by the IAEA as IR-40, according to their respective ratings.

• Modernizing of the original design in order to be a multi-purpose research reactor

comprising radio-isotope production, structural materials and fuel (pins and assembly

prototypes) testing and able to conduct other neutronic experiments which demand

high neutron fluxes (more than 1014).

• Using heavy water as coolant, moderator and reflector. Light water would be utilized as

an annular ring around the compact new core for safety reasons if necessary.

• Around 78 fuel assemblies in a tight hexagonal grid spacing with the following

preliminary characteristics will be loaded.

• Up to 3.67 percent enriched UO2, in the improved assembly design, will be used as fuel.

• Power will not exceed to 20 MWth.

• Adding different types of beam tubes to the existing beam tubes which being extended

to the edge of the new compact core.

• Having one central channel in the center of the new core with passive cooling system

for the purpose of structural materials and fuel pins and assembly prototypes testing

with neutron flux beyond 2•1014, twelve in-core irradiation channels (IIC) inside the core

and twelve lateral irradiation chennals (LIC) just next to the outer ring of fuel assemblies.

• The location of the in-core and lateral irradiation channels should be designed and fixed

to meet the best anticipated performances.

• Consistent with relevant section of Annex 1, sibsidiary laboratories are part of the

modernization project of the Arak Research Reactor. In Addition, Annex III reinforce

design and construction of subsidiary laboratoties.

• The highest tolerable pressure for the first and second loop is 0.33 Mpa (at the

interance of the reactor pit).

• The highest possible flow rate for coolant is 610 kg/s at the pressure of 0.33 MPa in the

main piping system and 42 Kg/sec for Moderator with the same conditions.



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Continue 4 :

Annex III - Civil Nuclear Cooperation

A. General


1. Iran and E3/EU+3 decided to co-operate, among others, including through IAEA

technical cooperation, where appropriate, and without prejudice to the existing bilateral

agreements, in different areas of civil nuclear co-operation to be developed within the

framework of this JCPOA, as detailed in this Annex. In this context, the Joint

Commission will also support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical

cooperation projects, as appropriate.


2. All civil nuclear cooperation projects under this JCPOA will be mutually determined by

the participating states and will be consistent with the JCPOA and the national laws and

regulations of the participating parties.


3. The civil nuclear and scientific cooperation projects envisioned between Iran and the

E3/EU+3 as part of this JCPOA may be undertaken in a variety of formats, with a variety

of potential participants. A given project undertaken by the E3/EU+3 will not necessarily

include participation by all E3/EU+3 parties:


3. bilateral or multilateral cooperation arrangements with Iran. Such arrangements would

be mutually determined by the participating states.


3. projects under the auspices of the IAEA, either through IAEA technical co-operation

projects including through Project and Supply Agreements.


3. through International Science and Technology Centres.

1.

2.

2.

Specifically, E3/EU+3 parties will undertake, to develop nuclear co-operation with Iran, in

particular within the following areas:


B. Reactors, Fuels and Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes


4. Modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment,

technologies and facilities


E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will facilitate Iran’s acquisition of light-water research

and power reactors, for research, development and testing, and for the supply of

electricity and desalination, with arrangements for the assured supply of nuclear fuel and

the removal of spent fuel as provided for in relevant contracts, for each reactor provided.

This may include the following areas for co-operation:


4. Construction as well as effective and safe operation of new light water power reactors

and associated equipment, according to Generation III+ requirements, including small

and medium sized nuclear reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as

appropriate.


4. Construction of state of the art light water moderated multipurpose research reactors

capable of testing fuel pins, assembly prototypes and structural materials with

associated related facilities, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate.


4. Supply of state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems for the above research

and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;


4. Supply of nuclear simulation and calculation codes and software solutions with regard

to the above areas, including joint development, as appropriate;


4. Supply of first and second loop main equipment as well as core of the above research

and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;


4. On-the-job training on fuel management scenarios and reshuffling for the above

research and power nuclear reactors;


4. Joint technical review of Iran’s current nuclear reactors, upon the request by Iran, in

order to upgrade current equipment and systems, including concerning nuclear safety;


5. Arak Modernisation Project


5. As described in Section B of Annex I, an international partnership composed

of E3/EU+3 parties and Iran, which may subsequently be enlarged to include

mutually determined third countries will be established, to support and facilitate the

redesign and rebuilding of the IR-40 reactor at Arak into a modernised, not

exceeding 20MWth, heavy-water moderated and cooled research reactor, based on

the agreed conceptual design (as attached to Annex I).


5. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have

responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project. A

Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to support

and facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor. An international

partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak

modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities as

described in Annex I. The Working Group could be enlarged to include other

countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and

Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing

their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of

Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the

reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants,

especially in the key areas such as redesign, design review and certification, reactor

core manufacturing, fuel design, fabrication and supply, safety and security, spent

fuel treatment or disposition, as well as concerning the supply of materials,

equipment, instrumentation and control systems, and subsequently contracts would

be concluded. The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance

needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with their

respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely

construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.


5. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the

modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out

by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the

reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for

commissioning and operation.


5. Iran will continue to assume the primary responsibility for financing the

modernisation project. Additional funding arrangements for the project, including for

IAEA projects supporting the Arak modernisation project, will be determined based

on the official document and contracts to be subsequently concluded.


6. Nuclear Fuel


6. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will support assistance to Iran, including through

the IAEA, as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear

fuel fabricated by Iran.


6. E3/EU+3 parties will seek to cooperate regarding the supply of modern fuels,

including, as appropriate, joint design and fabrication, the relevant licenses and

fabrication technologies and equipment and related infrastructure, for current and

future nuclear research and power reactors, including technical assistance on

purification processes, forming and metallurgical activities for different types of

nuclear fuel clads and cladding for the modernised Arak heavy water research

reactor.


C. Research and Development (R&D) Practices


7. To implement other aspects of this JCPOA and in support of a broader opening of

scientific engagements between the E3/EU+3 and Iran, the E3/EU+3 and Iran will seek

cooperation and scientific exchange in the field of nuclear science and technology:


7. Accelerator-based nuclear physics and nuclear astrophysics research, and stable

isotope production in international collaboration at the nuclear, physics, and

technology centre at the Fordow facility. Iran will request from the E3/EU+3 and

other interested parties specific proposals for cooperative international nuclear,

physics, and technology projects and will host an international workshop to review

these proposals. The goal is to realise international collaborative projects within a

few years. The transitioning to stable isotope production of two cascades will be

conducted in a joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the

basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon.

7. Plasma physics and nuclear fusion;

7. Research reactor applications at the TRR, modernized Arak reactor, or at other

future research reactors in Iran, such as:

1. Training

2. Radio-isotope production and utilization

3. Nuclear desalination

4. Neutron transmutation doping

5. Neutron activation analysis

6. Neutron capture therapy

7. Neutron imaging and materials characterization studies using neutron beams


7. E3/EU+3 parties and Iran could also explore co-operation in the following additional

areas:


1. Design, manufacture and/or assembly of in-core measuring instrumentation and

technologies;

2. Nuclear instrumentation and control, systems and electronics design,

manufacture and/or assembly;

3. Fusion technology and plasma physics and related infrastructure and facilitating

contribution of Iran to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

(ITER) Project and/or similar projects, including relevant IAEA technical

cooperation projects;

4. Neutrino astronomy;

5. Design and manufacturing, and supply, of different types of accelerators and

supply of related equipment including through relevant IAEA technical

cooperation projects;

6. Data acquisition and processing software and interface equipment;



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Continue 5 :

D. Nuclear Safety, Safeguards and Security

8. Nuclear safety


E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate

with Iran to establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, engage in workshops and training

events in Iran to support interactions between Iranian nuclear regulatory authorities and

those from the E3/EU+3 and elsewhere to, among other things, share lessons learned

on establishing and maintaining regulatory independence and effectiveness, and

training on implementing nuclear safety culture and best practices; facilitate exchanges

and visits to nuclear regulatory authorities and nuclear power plants outside of Iran

focusing on best practices for safe operation; and enhance and strengthen domestic

emergency preparedness and severe accident management capability.

Provide support and assistance to enable Iran to join relevant conventions on nuclear

safety and security, e.g. through workshops or seminars furthering accession to such

commitments. Such workshops or seminars could also take place under the auspices of

the IAEA.


E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, will co-operate with Iran in

the following areas of nuclear safety, as well as in other areas to be mutually agreed:


8. Conclusion of bilateral/multilateral agreements with related organisations and research

centres;


8. Supply of valid codes, instruments and equipment related to nuclear safety;


8. Facilitate exchange of knowledge and experience in the area of nuclear safety;


8. Enhance and strengthen domestic emergency preparedness and severe accident

management capability;


8. Arrange on-the-job training and apprenticeship courses for reactor and facility

operators, regulatory authority personnel and related supportive organizations in the

area of nuclear safety inside and outside of Iran;


8. Establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, which shall be equipped with necessary tools,

techniques and equipment, in order to support and facilitate technical and professional

training and exchange of lessons-learned for reactor and facility operators, regulatory

authority personnel and related supportive organizations;


9. Nuclear Safeguards


E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate

with Iran on the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and

transparency measures in Iran. Co-operation in the following areas can be envisaged:


9. Cooperation in the form of on-the-job trainings and workshops to strengthen nuclear

material accounting and control process, human resource development, and quality

assurance/quality control processes;


9. E3/EU+3 parties, and other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran

for the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and transparency

measures in Iran.


9. This cooperation could take the form of training and workshops to strengthen Iran’s

safeguards regulatory authority, nuclear material accounting and control processes,

human resource development, and quality assurance/quality control processes.


10. Nuclear Security


E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate

with Iran on the implementation of nuclear security guidelines and best practices. Cooperation

in the following areas can be envisaged:


10. Co-operation in the form of training courses and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability

to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear facilities and

systems as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical

protection systems;


10. Co-operation through training and workshops to strengthen Iran’s ability to protect

against, and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as to

enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems.


E. Nuclear Medicine and Radioisotopes, Associated Technologies, Facilities and

Processes


11. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran to improve the

utilization of nuclear medicine in Iran in order to enhance Iran's expertise in diagnostic

imaging and radiotherapy, increase the availability of medical radioisotopes for

diagnosis and treatment of Iranian citizens, and facilitate Iran’s participation in the

broader international scientific and nuclear medicine community. Such cooperation may

include:


11. Upgrades to the infrastructure associated with existing cyclotron facilities,

including for medical radioisotopes production.


11. Facilitating Iranian acquisition of a new cyclotron, and associated radio-pharmacy

equipment, for medical radioisotopes production.


11. Acquisition of state-of-the-art diagnostic imaging and radiotherapy equipment for

existing or new nuclear medicine centers, including co-operation between hospitals

for the treatment of individual patients.


11. Cooperation on occupational and patient dosimetry procedures.


11. Improved target utilization to increase radioisotope production.


11. Acquisition of radioisotope sources for bracho therapy, and radiotherapy instrument

calibration, and other medical and industrial applications.


11. Supply of state-of-the art radio-medicine center and necessary laboratories.


F. Waste Management and Facility Decommissioning


12. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in the safe,

effective, and efficient management and disposition of nuclear and radiological wastes

derived from Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities and nuclear medicine, radioisotope

production and/or consumption activities.


13. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in areas of safe,

effective, and environmentally friendly best practices for facility decontamination and

decommissioning, including co-operation on long term storage facilities for the

repository of low and medium level waste.


14. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to facilitate exchanges and visits to

relevant sites and locations outside of Iran related to effective waste management and

best practices.


15. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will facilitate the supply of appropriate equipment and

systems for waste management and depository facilities in Iran.


G. Other projects


16. Other projects may be implemented between the relevant E3/EU+3 parties and Iran, as

mutually determined by the participants in the JCPOA, including in the following areas:


16. Construction of nuclear desalination and associated infrastructure in Iran;


16. Development of laser technology for medical applications (e.g. for eye surgery);



~^~


...
 

BLACKEAGLE

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Quote :

After many months of principled diplomacy, the P5+1 -- the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany -- along with the European Union, have achieved a long-term comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran that will verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful going forward.

This deal stands on the foundation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), achieved in November of 2013, and the framework for this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), announced in Lausanne on April 2, 2015 that set the requirements for the deal with the P5+ 1 and Iran, alongside the European Union announced today.

Now, with this deal in place, the U.S., our allies, and the international community can know that tough, new requirements will keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Here's how:


Blocking the Four Pathways to a Nuclear Weapon

Building a nuclear bomb requires either uranium or plutonium. But thanks to this deal, Iran’s four possible ways to leverage those fissile materials are blocked.





The Uranium pathways at Natanz and Fordow

Iran would needs two key elements to construct a uranium bomb: tens of thousands of centrifuges and enough highly enriched uranium to produce enough material to construct a uranium bomb.

There are currently two uranium enrichment facilities in the country: the Natanz facility and the Fordow facility.

Let’s take a look at Iran’s uranium stockpile first. Currently, Iran has a uranium stockpile to create 8 to ten nuclear bombs.

But thanks to this nuclear deal, Iran must reduce its stockpile of uranium by 98%, and will keep its level of uranium enrichment at 3.67% -- significantly below the enrichment level needed to create a bomb.

Iran also needs tens of thousands of centrifuges to create highly enriched uranium for a bomb. Right now, Iran has nearly 20,000 centrifuges between their Natanz and Fordow facilities. But under this deal, Iran must reduce its centrifuges to 6,104 for the next ten years. No enrichment will be allowed at the Fordow facility at all, and the only centrifuges Iran will be allowed to use are their oldest and least efficient models.

In short, here’s the difference this historic deal will make:





The Plutonium pathway at the Arak reactor

The third way Iran could build a nuclear weapon is by using weapons-grade plutonium. The only site where Iran could accomplish this is the Arak reactor, a heavy-water nuclear reactor. Right now, this reactor could be used in a weapons program, but under this deal, the Arak reactor will be redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium. And all the spent fuel rods (which could also be source material for weapons-grade plutonium) will be sent out of the country as long as this reactor exists. What’s more, Iran will not be able to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years. That means, because of this deal, Iran will no longer have a source for weapons-grade plutonium.

A covert pathway to building a secret nuclear program

The previous three pathways occur at facilities that Iran has declared. But what if they try to build a nuclear program in secret? That’s why this deal is so important. Under the new nuclear deal, Iran has committed to extraordinary and robust monitoring, verification, and inspection. International inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will not only be continuously monitoring every element of Iran’s declared nuclear program, but they will also be verifying that no fissile material is covertly carted off to a secret location to build a bomb. And if IAEA inspectors become aware of a suspicious location, Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to their IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which will allow inspectors to access and inspect any site they deem suspicious. Such suspicions can be triggered by holes in the ground that could be uranium mines, intelligence reports, unexplained purchases, or isotope alarms.

Basically, from the minute materials that could be used for a weapon comes out of the ground to the minute it is shipped out of the country, the IAEA will have eyes on it and anywhere Iran could try and take it:




What Iran’s Nuclear Program Would Look Like Without This Deal

As it stands today, Iran has a large stockpile of enriched uranium and nearly 20,000 centrifuges, enough to create 8 to 10 bombs. If Iran decided to rush to make a bomb without the deal in place, it would take them 2 to 3 months until they had enough weapon-ready uranium (or highly enriched uranium) to build their first nuclear weapon. Left unchecked, that stockpile and that number of centrifuges would grow exponentially, practically guaranteeing that Iran could create a bomb—and create one quickly – if it so chose.

This deal removes the key elements needed to create a bomb and prolongs Iran’s breakout time from 2-3 months to 1 year or more if Iran broke its commitments. Importantly, Iran won’t garner any new sanctions relief until the IAEA confirms that Iran has followed through with its end of the deal. And should Iran violate any aspect of this deal, the U.N., U.S., and E.U. can snap the sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy back into place.

Here’s what Iran has committed to:




The difference this deal is significant. Take a look at exactly what Iran’s nuclear program will look like now under this deal:






Official Source : The White House
 
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Quote :

The White House


After many months of principled diplomacy, the P5+1 -- the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany -- along with the European Union, have achieved a long-term comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran that will verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful going forward.

This deal stands on the foundation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), achieved in November of 2013, and the framework for this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), announced in Lausanne on April 2, 2015 that set the requirements for the deal with the P5+ 1 and Iran, alongside the European Union announced today.

Now, with this deal in place, the U.S., our allies, and the international community can know that tough, new requirements will keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Here's how:


Blocking the Four Pathways to a Nuclear Weapon

Building a nuclear bomb requires either uranium or plutonium. But thanks to this deal, Iran’s four possible ways to leverage those fissile materials are blocked.





The Uranium pathways at Natanz and Fordow

Iran would needs two key elements to construct a uranium bomb: tens of thousands of centrifuges and enough highly enriched uranium to produce enough material to construct a uranium bomb.

There are currently two uranium enrichment facilities in the country: the Natanz facility and the Fordow facility.

Let’s take a look at Iran’s uranium stockpile first. Currently, Iran has a uranium stockpile to create 8 to ten nuclear bombs.

But thanks to this nuclear deal, Iran must reduce its stockpile of uranium by 98%, and will keep its level of uranium enrichment at 3.67% -- significantly below the enrichment level needed to create a bomb.

Iran also needs tens of thousands of centrifuges to create highly enriched uranium for a bomb. Right now, Iran has nearly 20,000 centrifuges between their Natanz and Fordow facilities. But under this deal, Iran must reduce its centrifuges to 6,104 for the next ten years. No enrichment will be allowed at the Fordow facility at all, and the only centrifuges Iran will be allowed to use are their oldest and least efficient models.

In short, here’s the difference this historic deal will make:





The Plutonium pathway at the Arak reactor

The third way Iran could build a nuclear weapon is by using weapons-grade plutonium. The only site where Iran could accomplish this is the Arak reactor, a heavy-water nuclear reactor. Right now, this reactor could be used in a weapons program, but under this deal, the Arak reactor will be redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium. And all the spent fuel rods (which could also be source material for weapons-grade plutonium) will be sent out of the country as long as this reactor exists. What’s more, Iran will not be able to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years. That means, because of this deal, Iran will no longer have a source for weapons-grade plutonium.

A covert pathway to building a secret nuclear program

The previous three pathways occur at facilities that Iran has declared. But what if they try to build a nuclear program in secret? That’s why this deal is so important. Under the new nuclear deal, Iran has committed to extraordinary and robust monitoring, verification, and inspection. International inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will not only be continuously monitoring every element of Iran’s declared nuclear program, but they will also be verifying that no fissile material is covertly carted off to a secret location to build a bomb. And if IAEA inspectors become aware of a suspicious location, Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to their IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which will allow inspectors to access and inspect any site they deem suspicious. Such suspicions can be triggered by holes in the ground that could be uranium mines, intelligence reports, unexplained purchases, or isotope alarms.

Basically, from the minute materials that could be used for a weapon comes out of the ground to the minute it is shipped out of the country, the IAEA will have eyes on it and anywhere Iran could try and take it:





What Iran’s Nuclear Program Would Look Like Without This Deal

As it stands today, Iran has a large stockpile of enriched uranium and nearly 20,000 centrifuges, enough to create 8 to 10 bombs. If Iran decided to rush to make a bomb without the deal in place, it would take them 2 to 3 months until they had enough weapon-ready uranium (or highly enriched uranium) to build their first nuclear weapon. Left unchecked, that stockpile and that number of centrifuges would grow exponentially, practically guaranteeing that Iran could create a bomb—and create one quickly – if it so chose.

This deal removes the key elements needed to create a bomb and prolongs Iran’s breakout time from 2-3 months to 1 year or more if Iran broke its commitments. Importantly, Iran won’t garner any new sanctions relief until the IAEA confirms that Iran has followed through with its end of the deal. And should Iran violate any aspect of this deal, the U.N., U.S., and E.U. can snap the sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy back into place.

Here’s what Iran has committed to:




The difference this deal is significant. Take a look at exactly what Iran’s nuclear program will look like now under this deal:






Official Source : The White House



~^~


...