Nate
NEW RECRUIT
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- Apr 2, 2015
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Andriy Parubiy, the vice speaker of Ukraine's Parliament and former national security adviser, stated on March 27th that there is a "high risk" of a "full-scale military operation" in the next few weeks.
An expert team led by Wesley Clark, a retired US Army General and former NATO supreme allied commander, informed the Atlantic Council in Washington on March 30th that "Ukrainian forces expect [an] attack within the next 60 days. This assessment is based on geographic imperatives, the ongoing pattern of Russian activity, and an analysis of Russian actions, statements, and Putin's psychology to date."
Finally, Russia' premier military analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, said on March 31st that the next "Russian offensive campaign" is "highly likely to begin soon."
Heightened fears of major Russian escalations—up to and including air strikes and a massive land assault—have occurred every one-to-two months since Russia's invasion of Crimea in February 2014. Russia has confounded these expectations by escalating slowly, steadily increasing its supply of arms, money, irregular forces, and regular troops—while always stopping short of a full-scale war.
No one knows why. Has Vladimir Putin been skittish about the risks involved? Did he just make a mistake and fail to seize the best opportunity to attack—i.e., anytime in the first few months after the Maidan Revolution? Or has he been developing fiendishly clever plans and sharpening his knives?
To launch a truly big war now would be a huge strategic mistake for Russia. Ukraine has a functioning government, police force, and army, and the latter has shown that it can dole out serious punishment to Putin's commandoes in eastern Ukraine. According to official Ukrainian sources, the Russian separatists have lost 14,600 men since the spring of last year. In comparison, Ukraine's armed forces incurred 1,232 deaths in 2014 and 2015. (If the number were to include soldiers who are missing in action, and probably dead, it would probably be 2,500–3,000.) That's a kill ratio of 1:4 or 1:5 in Ukraine's favor.
An expert team led by Wesley Clark, a retired US Army General and former NATO supreme allied commander, informed the Atlantic Council in Washington on March 30th that "Ukrainian forces expect [an] attack within the next 60 days. This assessment is based on geographic imperatives, the ongoing pattern of Russian activity, and an analysis of Russian actions, statements, and Putin's psychology to date."
Finally, Russia' premier military analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, said on March 31st that the next "Russian offensive campaign" is "highly likely to begin soon."
Heightened fears of major Russian escalations—up to and including air strikes and a massive land assault—have occurred every one-to-two months since Russia's invasion of Crimea in February 2014. Russia has confounded these expectations by escalating slowly, steadily increasing its supply of arms, money, irregular forces, and regular troops—while always stopping short of a full-scale war.
No one knows why. Has Vladimir Putin been skittish about the risks involved? Did he just make a mistake and fail to seize the best opportunity to attack—i.e., anytime in the first few months after the Maidan Revolution? Or has he been developing fiendishly clever plans and sharpening his knives?
To launch a truly big war now would be a huge strategic mistake for Russia. Ukraine has a functioning government, police force, and army, and the latter has shown that it can dole out serious punishment to Putin's commandoes in eastern Ukraine. According to official Ukrainian sources, the Russian separatists have lost 14,600 men since the spring of last year. In comparison, Ukraine's armed forces incurred 1,232 deaths in 2014 and 2015. (If the number were to include soldiers who are missing in action, and probably dead, it would probably be 2,500–3,000.) That's a kill ratio of 1:4 or 1:5 in Ukraine's favor.
