Battle of Gazala "Rommels Greatest Victory"

[Joe Shearer]

The Allies limited the flanking options available (for both sides) by way of minefields looping and adjoining back to the northern escarpment (where ritchie surveyed +reserves held)...and of course strengthened by the defensive strongholds like Bir Hakeim. There was a gap left between the minefield and escarpment to create a gate for allied forces to use where the need arised in the open southern flank area (and beyond to try get at the german flanks). This meant the Axis hooks (given they are the attacking force) had to be planned/commited and risked at very high stakes generally (than they otherwise would be)....and if they went too far around, they would basically crash against the well defended escarpment area (with fresh forces and artillery cover).

Basically the Axis attack needed mine clearing in the spearheads for the mid-length flanking operations (one of which Rommel was in personally) and if discovered too easily and/or stretched too far at the opportune time...they would get routed....so Rommel knew he couldn't go all out on this kind of tactic (probably having long ago read and understood how Lee's battles north of the mason dixon line turned out regarding over-flanking commitments in contrast to Jacksons more appropriate use further south on home turf)...but just enough where the risk/reward seemed promising to him.

There were enough gaps in the artillery cover for Rommel to succeed combined with lack of response from the Allied forces at the critical moments....I also feel Ritchie overcommited to the mobile formations in the desert in his own counter-flanking+ open defensive engagement attempts, when they may have been better used in the defensive perimeter (esp around the gate chokepoint area)...and with very low frequency + organised and well spearheaded counter attacks. But its all in 20/20 hindsight of course.

I was thinking about the generic reluctance to loop out into the desert; it might have been inappropriate in this case, and in fact, the minefields got Rommel into trouble, when he found himself unable to push back to his original positions to the west due to the minefield around the 150 Brigade box. But in general, even when not facing set-piece defences like Ritchie, they did not really take advantage of the space to the south.

You pointed out a contradiction in Ritchie's plans that made a difference: he should have depended on his 'boxes' more. If you recall, the original model did shelter cavalry inside the 'squares'.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Yes i am serious , @The Sandman you should open a thread about re-telling of Battles fought by Soldiers from pre-partition era though i will keep chasing @Joe Shearer also and remind him too ....More the participation better the result...

I will do it, but there are one or two unfinished tasks still on hand, which I hope to clear in a week or ten days.

 

[Hithchiker]

I will do it, but there are one or two unfinished tasks still on hand, which I hope to clear in a week or ten days.

No problem sir, take your time

 

[Nilgiri]

You pointed out a contradiction in Ritchie's plans that made a difference: he should have depended on his 'boxes' more. If you recall, the original model did shelter cavalry inside the 'squares'.

Indeed, the stiff upper lip is often hard to maintain during the planning and actual battle ....especially knowing the opponent is the one setting the dynamics...and that you cannot be too static given the results in the war so far.

There was just enough in the mettle for Wellingtons squares in waterloo for example...but other times there was enough give for an opponent to exploit...its why I don't bear down too harsh on the generals overall in any time period given we have hindsight and they really didn't have too much (the current war that they are in evolving and such).

Bad Generals tend to be those that do bad ideas continually when they are proven to not work (and have a powerful patron in some way so they are not easily removed and replaced so they can keep going for long enough to show that)....good/great generals are ones that adapt/learn and find innovative ways to implement changes and when they take calculated risks they often go into the annals of history as being a cut above the rest. In between we have all the ones we don't really remember too well, they did enough in most cases...but there was just enough meandering and dissonance in whatever way that gave a free advantage to the opponent....and someone like Rommel, Caesar, Alexander or Napoleon generally took it with both hands....even if they were messing up in some way at the moment too.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Indeed, the stiff upper lip is often hard to maintain during the planning and actual battle ....especially knowing the opponent is the one setting the dynamics...and that you cannot be too static given the results in the war so far.

There was just enough in the mettle for Wellingtons squares in waterloo for example...but other times there was enough give for an opponent to exploit...its why I don't bear down too harsh on the generals overall in any time period given we have hindsight and they really didn't have too much (the current war that they are in evolving and such).

Bad Generals tend to be those that do bad ideas continually when they are proven to not work (and have a powerful patron in some way so they are not easily removed and replaced so they can keep going for long enough to show that)....good/great generals are ones that adapt/learn and find innovative ways to implement changes and when they take calculated risks they often go into the annals of history as being a cut above the rest. In between we have all the ones we don't really remember too well, they did enough in most cases...but there was just enough meandering and dissonance in whatever way that gave a free advantage to the opponent....and someone like Rommel, Caesar, Alexander or Napoleon generally took it with both hands....even if they were messing up in some way at the moment too.

Completely off-topic: I keep re-reading Waterloo, and every time it takes on a different perspective (apart from the overwhelming reality that Napoleon lost, and that Ney should never have been promoted beyond a Colonel, brave rearguard actions in Spain and Russia notwithstanding - his manifold other blunders make painful reading, and in your formulation, he is a stupid man who kept repeating his basic error). A very ambiguous battle.

I suppose the way to read it is to deconstruct it. But then Jomini's criticism of Napoleon echoes when one does that: everything he got right was genius, everything he didn't was an act of God, or a horrible crime by a subordinate. Nobody refers to the number of mistakes that were made because his Marshals could not, or would not, interpret his instructions the way he wanted them interpreted. And nobody has remarked, from whatever I have read, about the sometimes weird instructions he issued, either on the one hand, the very definite language that did not permit deviation and kept people plodding along a fruitless path, like Grouchy did, or, on the other hand, the very broad instructions that could be interpreted in any way whatever, and were.

Back to topic: were there too many plodding British generals in the British Army? Were the Germans (and the Russians) qualitatively superior? Was German success a flash in the pan, a bold departure that caught people off guard until they had time to figure out what to do for the future?

 

[I.R.A]

No not entirely but important parts because i wanted to put it in as much detail as possible about which units were involved where, when and how for e.g "Which unit stopped the attack of 90th Light on El Adem on 28th May 1942" and so on i didn't cut paste the entire thing (that would'v been too easy hahaha) but compiled data corrected a lot of stuff cross checked the numbers from different sites/sources etc tried to keep the whole thing to the point with important legit info.

I hope @MaarKhoor sought your permission, before posting your work (on your behalf) at this site ?

Casualties

Allies

-Casualties amounted to 90,000 men (either killed, wounded or missing 32,000 captured)
-540 tanks (destroyed, damaged or captured)

Axis

-3360 men killed, captured or wounded. (I can't confirm the axis casualties a lot of conflicting reports.
-114 Tank destroyed, damaged or captured

Casualty ratio Allies to Axis approximately 26:1

Tanks approximately 5:1

And Rommel was thinking of surrendering ...........

 

[MaarKhoor]

I hope @MaarKhoor sought your permission, before posting your work (on your behalf) at this site ?

I did't claim credit and clearly mentioned (copied from other site) with all the sources, further sandman himself copied it from various sources.

 

[I.R.A]

I did't claim credit and clearly mentioned (copied from other site) with all the sources, further sandman himself copied it from various sources.

Bro you should mention "Compiled by Sandman" ......... he searched and arranged it for the readers.

 

[The Sandman]

I did't claim credit and clearly mentioned (copied from other site) with all the sources, further sandman himself copied it from various sources.

It wasn't a copy/paste as i have explained in my earlier post this whole thing took a lot of time (i mean a lot of time) and a lot of researching/reading/editing/correcting writing for me not just a few mins so if not permission than at least you should've given the credit.

I hope @MaarKhoor sought your permission, before posting your work (on your behalf) at this site ?

No he didn't. :/

And Rommel was thinking of surrendering ...........

It was the fuel and water that were his real opponents (imo) during the Afrika Campaign and he was always short of that so that's why he was worried if the British counter attacked at this moment (when his forces were almost sitting ducks) he would've to surrender.

 

[I.R.A]

It was the fuel and water that were his real opponents (imo) during the Afrika Campaign and he was always short of that so that's why he was worried if the British counter attacked at this moment (when his forces were almost sitting ducks) he would've to surrender.

British incompetence? Was the supply situation same for British? They had the port under control right?

A commander and a force that is short of supplies managed to achieve 26:1 and 5:1 disparity ............ well I think he was rightly awarded the title.

 

[The Sandman]

British incompetence? Was the supply situation same for British? They had the port under control right?

A commander and a force that is short of supplies managed to achieve 26:1 and 5:1 disparity ............ well I think he was rightly awarded the title.

Yes the British never had supply issues like the DAK did (after all the Royal navy had complete control of seas) it was not only the German high command who was the prob it was also the Italians who were the problem they preferred to supply their forces first in Afrika Rommel was really annoyed by all of this supply issue.

But the British commanders at that time were also not suited for this type of combat they didn't had that quick decision making mind i mean look at Rommel he turned a Recce mission into a full on offensive!!

 

[The Sandman]

Yes i am serious , @The Sandman you should open a thread about re-telling of Battles fought by Soldiers from pre-partition era

I didn't get it you mean more WW2 or earlier battles?

 

[Joe Shearer]

It wasn't a copy/paste as i have explained in my earlier post this whole thing took a lot of time (i mean a lot of time) and a lot of researching/reading/editing/correcting writing for me not just a few mins so if not permission than at least you should've given the credit.

No he didn't. :/

It was the fuel and water that were his real opponents (imo) during the Afrika Campaign and he was always short of that so that's why he was worried if the British counter attacked at this moment (when his forces were almost sitting ducks) he would've to surrender.

Exactly.

That was his weakness. Not the fighting spirit of his men, not the condition of his troops and his tanks and lorries, but the shortage of consumables.

 

[Joe Shearer]

British incompetence? Was the supply situation same for British? They had the port under control right?

A commander and a force that is short of supplies managed to achieve 26:1 and 5:1 disparity ............ well I think he was rightly awarded the title.

This particular set of generals, Ritchie and Messervy, didn't do very well. Ritchie was paralysed and inactive, and let opportunity after opportunity go, waiting to see what further would happen. Messervy was just not up to speed; read @Nilgiri a few posts higher up about the quality of generals in, as it were, general.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Yes the British never had supply issues like the DAK did (after all the Royal navy had complete control of seas) it was not only the German high command who was the prob it was also the Italians who were the problem they preferred to supply their forces first in Afrika Rommel was really annoyed by all of this supply issue.

But the British commanders at that time were also not suited for this type of combat they didn't had that quick decision making mind i mean look at Rommel he turned a Recce mission into a full on offensive!!

If you have not already done so, read his battle record in the French campaign. Guderian supplied the theory, Rommel (and Manstein) implemented it.