Iran Missiles

[Scorpion]

Iran Missiles Force.



|A|Ashoura (missile) |B| BM25 Musudan |F| Fajr 7- Fajr-3 (missile)- Fateh-110 |G| Ghadr-110 |N| Naze'at |P| Persian Gulf (missile) Project Koussar |Q| Qiam 1 |S|Safir (rocket)-Sejjil-Shahab-1Shahab-2 Shahab-3 - Shahab-4 - Shahab-5 - Shahab-6 |Z| Zelzal-1 - Zelzal-2 - Zelzal-3.

​

The Islamic Republic’s arsenal now includes several types of short-range and medium-range missiles. Estimates vary on specifics, and Iran has exaggerated its capabilities in the past. But there is widespread consensus that Tehran has acquired and creatively adapted foreign technology to continuously increase the quality and quantity of its arsenal. It has also launched an ambitious space program that works on some of the same technology. The arsenal includes:

Shahab missiles: Since the late 1980s, Iran has purchased additional short- and medium-range missiles from foreign suppliers and adapted them to its strategic needs. The Shahabs, Persian for “meteors,” were long the core of Iran’s program. They use liquid fuel, which involves a time-consuming launch. They include:

The Shahab-1 is based on the Scud-B. (The Scud series was originally developed by the Soviet Union). It has a range of about 300 kms or 185 miles.

The Shahab-2 is based on the Scud-C. It has a range of about 500 kms, or 310 miles. In mid-2010, Iran is widely estimated to have between 200 and 300 Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles capable of reaching targets in neighboring countries.

The Shahab-3 is based on the Nodong, which is a North Korean missile. It has a range of about 900 km or 560 miles. It has a nominal payload of 1,000 kg. A modified version of the Shahab-3, renamed the Ghadr-1, began flight tests in 2004. It theoretically extends Iran’s reach to about 1,600 km or 1,000 miles, which qualifies as a medium-range missile. But it carries a smaller, 750-kg warhead.

Although the Ghadr-1 was built with key North Korean components, Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani boasted at the time, “Today, by relying on our defense industry capabilities, we have been able to increase our deterrent capacity against the military expansion of our enemies.”

Sajjil missiles: Sajjil means “baked clay” in Persian. These are a class of medium-range missiles that use solid fuel, which offer many strategic advantages. They are less vulnerable to preemption because the launch requires shorter preparation – minutes rather than hours. Iran is the only country to have developed missiles of this range without first having developed nuclear weapons.

This family of missiles centers on the Sajjil-2, a domestically produced surface-to-surface missile. It has a medium-range of about 2,200 km or 1,375 miles when carrying a 750-kg warhead. It was test fired in 2008 under the name,Sajjil. The Sajjil-2, which is probably a slightly modified version, began test flights in 2009. This missile would allow Iran to “target any place that threatens Iran,” according to Brig. Gen. Abdollah Araghi, a Revolutionary Guard commander.

The Sajjil-2, which is unlikely to become operational before 2012, is the most likely nuclear delivery vehicle—if Iran decides to develop an atomic bomb. But it would need to build a bomb small enough to fit on the top of this missile, which would be a major challenge.

The Sajjil program’s success indicates that Iran’s long-term missile acquisition plans are likely to focus on solid-fuel systems. They are more compact and easier to deploy on mobile launchers. They require less time to prepare for launch, making them less vulnerable to preemption by aircraft or other missile defense systems.
Iran could attempt to use Sajjiltechnologies to produce a three-stage missile capable of flying 3,700 km or 2,200 miles. But it is unlikely to be developed and actually fielded before 2015.

Space program: Iran’s ambitious space program provides engineers with critical experience developing powerful booster rockets and other skills that could be used in developing longer-range missiles, including ICBMs.

The Safir, which means “messenger” or “ambassador” in Persian, is the name of the carrier rocket that launched Iran’s first satellite into space in 2009. It demonstrated a new sophistication in multistage separation and propulsion systems.
The Simorgh, which is the Persian name of a benevolent, mythical flying creature, is another carrier rocket to launch satellites. A mock-up was unveiled in 2010. It has a cluster of four engines and indicates that Iran’s space program is making progress in its long-term goals.

 

[UAE]

FATEH A-110
Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Alternate Name:Mershad, Zelzal-2 variant
Class:Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
Basing:Road-mobile
Length:8.86 m
Diameter:0.61 m
Launch Weight:3,450 kg
Payload:500 kg
Warhead:HE, chemical, submunitions
Propulsion:Single-stage solid propellant
Range:200-210 km
Status:Operational
The Fateh A-110 is a short-range, road-mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile. It is most likely a modified version of the unguided Zelzal-2, with the addition of control and guidance systems. 1 The Fateh A-110 is designed to replace many of the aging Scud systems currently used in the Middle East. While the program is based in Iran, the missile is believed to incorporate components from Chinese contractors. In 2006 the US Department of Treasury accused Great Wall Industry, a Chinese Corporation, and its partners for playing a lead role in the development of the Fateh missile system. 2

Iran began developing the Fateh A-110 in 1995. Sources indicate that the missile is 8.86 m long, 0.61 m in diameter, and weighs 3,450 kg. It uses a single-stage solid propellant engine and has a range of 210 km (130 miles), although it is possible that Iran will add extra boosters in order to increase its range to 400 km (249 miles). The missile might be as accurate as 100 m CEP using a combination of inertial guidance and a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system, though some sources suggest that the accuracy is much lower, as they do not think that the missile is capable of much inflight maneuvering or correction. Iranian sources claim that the weapon has a high degree of accuracy, a claim that would suggest inflight control systems that are not apparent from photos of the missile. It can carry a payload of some 500 kg and is most likely intended to deliver a high explosive, chemical, or submunitions warhead. The possibility remains, however, that Iran could deploy the Fateh A-110 with biological or nuclear warheads. 3

The first test flight of the Fateh A-110 took place in May 2001, with a second in September of 2002. 4 A third test was recorded in February 2003. A fourth test was successfully completed during the second Holy Prophet military exercise in November 2006. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard successfully tested the Fateh in January of 2007 during an annual war game. 5 A fifth successful test was completed in September 2007 alongside the Qadr-1 and the Shahab-3. Additionally, unconfirmed reports suggest that at least five more tests have occurred since 2008. 6 During its tests, the Fateh A-110 was fired from a fixed launcher similar to the one used by the Russian S-75 Guideline surface-to-air missile. However, it is more likely that Iran has designed a launch vehicle to make Fateh A-110 road mobile. The launch vehicles are probably converted Scud launchers, trucks, or Zelzal-2 launch vehicles. 7 Reports indicate that the Fateh A-110’s tactical use is similar to that of a Scud system. Although Iran has improved the missile’s overall ability, its accuracy makes the Fateh A-110 ineffective against moving military targets. However, the missile is capable of hitting most large military targets such as bases and airfields.

The missile entered low-rate production in October 2002 and initial operational achievement is believed to have occurred in 2004. Syria is known to be developing a similar short-range solid-propellant missile and to have exported a similar design to North Korea. Given their history of technological exchanges and the decreased cost of working together, it is likely that Syria and North Korea are involved with the Fateh A-110. 8 Unconfirmed reports from 2008 suggest Hezbollah was supplied with Fateh A-110 rockets by Imad Mughniyeh, a recently deceased officer in the organization who reportedly received these weapons from Iran. 9 It is possible that these were some of the Zelzal weapons destroyed in Lebanon by Israeli forces in 2007. Numbers and production information relating to the Fateh A-110 are currently uncertain, yet Iranian media sources claim that facilities have been created to mass produce the weapon. 10

Two improved versions of the Fateh A-110 are believed to be in development. These would probably be designated the A-110A (or Fateh 2) and the A-110B (or Fateh 3). A 2008 report suggested that Syria was building a surface-to-surface missile with Iranian assistance. This cooperative project is believed to be based upon the A-110B and have an operational range of at least 300 km. It is expected that the A-110B will have a slightly reduced payload of 480kg and an accuracy of 250 m CEP. 11

​

 

[UAE]

GHADR-1
Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Alternate Name:Ghadr-110, Ghadr-101, Shahab 3A variant
Class:Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
Length:15.86 m
Launch Weight:19,000 kg
Payload:Single warhead, 800 kg
Warhead:Nuclear, chemical, HE, submunitions
Propulsion:Liquid first-stage, solid second-stage propellant
Range:1,950 km
Status:Unknown
In Service:2007
The Ghadr-1 is a medium-range ballistic missile currently being designed and developed by Iran. Sources indicate that the missile will have a range of approximately 1,800 km, which would allow it to attack targets in Israel and across the Middle East. 1 Given recent reports from 2008, it is possible that this missile system is operational, yet there have been no conclusive or publicly visible tests of the weapon. The only acknowledgement of the Ghadr-1 is its public display on parade and unconfirmed reports of ground testing of its propulsion system.

The Ghadr-1 appears to be an improved variant of the Shahab-3A, also referred to as the Ghadr-101 and the Ghadr-110. There are mixed reports regarding the new missile. In 2004, it was believed to have a liquid-fuel first stage and a solid-fuel second stage.2 According to Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, this would allow it to have a range of 1,950 km. The length is thought to be 15.86 m, with a launch weight of about 19,000 kg. If reports regarding the Ghadr-1 accuracy are correct, then it would be a significant improvement of the Shahab 3 (2,500 CEP). A December 2008 report noted a CEP of 300 for the Ghadr-1. 3 Reports also indicate the possibility that Ghadr could be designed to carry a nuclear payload. This possibility is raised with uncertainty as the Ghadr appears to be comparable to the Shahab system, whose apparent goal is to obtain such a payload. 4

The Ghadr-1 is also believed to have a higher maneuverability than the Shahab-3. While some sources believe that it is the same missile as the Shahab 4, the higher maneuverability as well as the 30 minute set-up time provide sufficient evidence to consider this a separate missile. 5 Additionally, sources from 2007 report that the Ghadr 1 may have a significantly shorter stated range than originally projected in 2004. It remains classified as an MRBM and is now considered distinct from its shorter range, Shahab-3, and longer range, Shahab-4, counterparts. 6 Sources also indicate that the Ghadr-1 is being manufactured entirely in Iran at the top-secret Hemmat Missile Industries Complex. 7 An article from December 2007, though, cites interaction between the German Intelligence agencies and Iranian nationals within German borders. The report states that on more than one occasion Iranian nationals have been held in conjunction with the smuggling of “dual use goods.” These items are usually converted for their secondary use, military needs, in Iran after their transit from Germany. Reports indicate that these dual use goods were used in the development of the Ghadr-1 missile system. 8

In December of 2004 the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) claimed ongoing research and ground testing of the Ghadr-1. 9 In March 2006, the same group claimed that Iran had ramped up its development of the Ghadr-1, allegedly 70 percent complete at the time. The NCRI added that the new missile was expected to be entirely complete in one year’s time. 10 Reports from October 2007 indicate that Teheran unveiled the Ghadr whose shape was very similar to that of the Shahab-3 MRBM. 11

 

[UAE]

M-11 VARIANT

Originated From:Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Alternate Name:DF-11, CSS-7, M-600, Tondar 68, Ghadr
Class:Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
Basing:Road-mobile
Length:7.50 m
Diameter:0.80 m
Launch Weight:3,800 kg
Payload:Single warhead, 490 kg
Warhead:HE
Propulsion:Single-stage solid propellant
Range:290 km
Status:Unknown
The Iranian M-11 is a short-range, road-mobile, solid propellant ballistic missile domestically produced and based off of the exported version from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC’s M-11 (DF-11/CSS-7) is an improved version of the Russian Scub B. Reports indicate a degree of uncertainty as to the status of the M-11 project.

DF-11 (M-11) displayed in PLA parade.
Air Power Australia (Air Power Australia - Home Page

As an improved Scud, M-11 is designed for deployment against fixed, large targets. Its range easily outdistances most conventional weapons, and the mobility obtained from a mobile launch vehicle allows it to be deployed during a military conflict. While it is insufficiently accurate to target individual military units, it could be used to attack small areas such as military bases, airfields and cities.

The original M-11 is 7.5 m in length, has a diameter of 0.8 m and a launch weight of approximately 3,800 kg. It is possible that the weight is significantly less on the Iranian variant in order to increase its range. The Iranian variant is classified as carrying a 490 kg warhead, which can be equipped with high explosive, chemical, submunitions, fuel-air explosive (FAE) or a nuclear yield of 2, 10 or 20 kT. It has a range that is probably less than 290 km, to remain within the limits of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 1 The accuracy of the weapon would be increased with the projected separating warhead. The separating warhead is a design feature that requires the warhead to detach itself from the missile body and continue on to its objective. The warhead is then able to adjust its trajectory based on fin design and its range due to weight redistribution. This attribute would be unique to the Iranian version.

The Iranian M-11 variant appears to have been brought to Iran from China. It most likely would have occurred at the same time that Pakistan received similar weapons. This time period is unclear but would have occurred before Pakistan’s first successful test in 2002. The M-11 was reportedly brought in pieces and later reassembled. Reports indicate that the Iranians could have obtained up to eighty of these weapons along with their Transporter-Erector-Launcher vehicles. These reports remain unconfirmed as Iran has not displayed or tested this weapon. 2 Reports confirm that the M-11 is the nuclear capable Pakistani Shaheen 1. 3 Reports also confirm the transfer of technology and support between Pakistan and Iran, in addition to Chinese aid. 4

 

[UAE]

SEJIL 1/2/3
Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Alternate Name:Ashoura, Ashura, Sajil, Sajjil
Class:Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
Basing:Road-mobile
Length:17.6 m
Diameter:1.25 m
Launch Weight:23,600 kg
Payload:Single warhead, 500-1,500 kg
Warhead:HE or nuclear
Propulsion:Two-stage solid propellant
Range:2,000 km
Status:Presumed Operational
In Service:2012
The Sejil missile is a two-stage, solid-propellant, intermediate-range ballistic missile domestically designed and built by Iran. It represents the culmination of Iranian weapons technology as it borrows heavily from the design and technology of the liquid-propelled Shahab missiles while integrating the solid-propellant technology of the Zelzal missiles.

Development of the Sejil missile likely began in the late 1990s, but the program can hardly be understood apart from other Iranian missile programs whose development began much earlier. Most importantly, Iran began development on the Zelzal missiles in 1994 or 1995. The production of the Zelzal missiles required Iran to develop the domestic ability to produce composite solid-propellant in fairly large quantities. The technology and equipment used in Zelzal fuel production has almost definitely been used for the Sejil missile project. It is believed that China aided Iran in the improvement of their solid-propellant production ability for the Zelzal missiles; it seems likely that China has also aided Iran in the production of fuel for the Sejil missile.

At the same time that Iran was developing composite solid-propellant fuel, they were working with the North Korean No Dong 1 missile design to produce the Shahab 3. The Shahab 3 design was used by Iranian engineers to produce a number of domestic missile technologies – a major advance from earlier Shahab designs, which relied almost entirely on Russian and North Korean technology. The Shahab 3 variants have provided a number of advantages over the original North Korean design and proved that Iranian engineers can domestically design and produce improved warheads and SLVs. The Sejil missile, internally quite different from the Shahab 3 missile (solid propellants require very different motors and internal design), probably borrows from a number of Shahab 3 technologies. At the very least, it is believed that the RV/nose cone design that first appeared in Shahab 3 variants has been used on the Sejil missile.

Though the missile has a similar size, weight, payload, and range to the Shahab 3 variants, the fact that it is fuelled by solid-propellants is a huge improvement over the Shahab design. Solid propellants allow for a near-immediate launch time, leaving the missile much less vulnerable during launch. Because solid-propellant missiles do not have to be fuelled immediately prior to launch, they are easily transported. On the other hand, solid propellant missiles have particular performance characteristics that make them more difficult to guide and control. How Iranian engineers have overcome these hurdles is unknown, but it seems likely that they have modified Shahab guidance systems and/or received considerable foreign assistance.

The Sejil missile has a length of 17.6 m, a diameter of 1.25 m, and an overall launch weight of 23,600 kg. It carries a payload of 500 to 1,000 kg. Presumably the missile will carry HE warheads until Iran gains nuclear warheads. The missile’s maximum range is about 2,000 km, though these figures are based upon a missile fuselage with the weight and performance characteristics of aeronautical-grade steel. Supposing that Iran had the technology to produce missiles built of maraging steel, titanium, or composite material, the missile would potentially be lighter and have an extended range upwards of 2,400 km.

The first test launch occurred in 2008 and the missile reportedly flew 800km. A second launch was conducted in May 2009 to test improved guidance and navigation systems. Four other flight tests have occurred since 2009, with the sixth test flying approximately 1,900 km into the Indian ocean. 1

The Sejil missile appears to be a unique Iranian design. Though some speculation has tied the missile to the Chinese DF-11 and DF-15, the size and specifications of the missile suggest that the Iranian missile is unique. Unlike earlier Iranian systems, the missile also does not appear to be a copy of a previously-released North Korean missile. Of course, it is highly likely that the missile project has made significant gains through foreign assistance. Because the design is new, Iran will probably have to subject it to a great deal of testing before putting the missile into regular operation. Assuming that the Sejil project moves at about the same speed as foreign missile development projects, Iran will probably not declare the missile operational until at least 2012. 2

The Sejil missile system may be operational, but regardless, Iran continues to make improvements. There may be multiple versions of the Sejil system. In 2009, Iran referred to the test launch as the Sejil 2. An unconfirmed report stated the a Sejil 3 may be in development. The Sejil 3 would reportedly have three stages, a maximum range of 4,000 km, and a launch weight of 38,000 kg. 3

​

 

[UAE]

SHAHAB 1
Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Alternate Name:'Scud B' variant
Class:Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
Basing:Road-mobile
Length:10.94 m
Diameter:0.88 m
Launch Weight:5,860 kg
Payload:Single warhead, 985 kg
Warhead:HE, chemical
Propulsion:Liquid propellant
Range:300 km
Status:Operational
In Service:1987
The Shahab 1 (translation: Meteor 1) is a single-stage, liquid-fueled, short-range ballistic missile. Iran obtained this weapon in 1987 from North Korea and implemented production of the weapon in the same year, though they may have originally acquired the missiles from Libya in 1985 and Syria in 1986. 1 The Shahab 1 is based off of the ‘Scud B’ platform. In order to understand the caliber of the Shahab 1 it is essential to briefly review the history of the Scud.

While the names of most ballistic missiles are obscure, the ‘Scud’ has become almost a household name. The SS-1A ‘Scud’ was designed a short time after the end of World War II by captured German scientists and is based upon the Nazi V-2 rocket which was used against London in the Second World War. In essence, the ‘Scud’ is the AK-47 of the missile world: reliable, simple and ubiquitous. The missile was produced in huge quantities and not even the Russians know exactly how many they built, let alone the number copied by foreign countries.

While most ‘Scud’ missiles now carry conventional explosives, the ‘Scud’ was originally developed to carry a 50 kT nuclear warhead. The SS-1B ‘Scud A’ (Russian designation R-11) entered into service in 1955 as a short range nuclear weapon to attack western Europe and was intended to carry a nuclear 50 kT yield warhead. The high explosive (HE) warhead was developed for export to other communist countries in the Cold War whom the Soviet Union was leery of giving nuclear strike capabilities.

The ‘Scud A’ was soon replaced with the SS-1C ‘Scud B’ The new missile had the advantage of being compatible with a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and could thus be deployed quickly and covertly. The TEL has built-in test equipment and is able to aim and fire the missile autonomously, though a separate command and control vehicle typically controls the targeting and firing. Aboard a TEL, a typical ‘Scud B’ takes approximately one hour to finish a single launch sequence.

By 1965, the new ‘Scud B’ missile was operational in many European and Middle Eastern counties. In 1973, Egypt fired a small number of the ‘Scud B’ missiles against Israel. Over 600 ‘Scud B’ and North Korean ‘Scud B’ variants were fired by Iran and Iraq between 1980 and 1988. Over 2,000 ‘Scud B’, and possibly a small number of ‘Scud C’ missiles, are thought to have been used in Afghanistan. The ‘Scud’ missiles used by Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991 were largely the Iraqis’ own improved variant of the ‘Scud B’, the Al Hussein. There were also a small number of ‘Scud’ missiles used in the 1994 civil war in Yemen and by Russia in Chechnya in 1996. A Russian report suggests that there were four ‘Scud B’ TEL and approximately 100 missiles in Afghanistan, some with the Taliban and some with Massoud’s forces, and could have been possibly passed to other various terrorist organizations. In 1998, Ukraine was reported to have three brigades with ‘Scud B’ missiles and a total of 55 missiles in service. Libya paraded in 1999 with some 20 refurbished ‘Scud B’ TEL vehicles with missiles. It is thought that this was done with assistance from North Korea.

‘Scud B’ missiles have been exported to: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Libya, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, UAE, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen. Unconfirmed reports between 1996 and 2000 have suggested that ‘Scud B’ missiles have been purchased by Armenia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Pakistan, Peru, and the Sudan. These missiles may have been built in the former Soviet Union. It has been reported that as many as 7,000 Scud missiles may have been built in Russia and that ‘Scud B’ missiles and improved variants have been built in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Syria. Consequently, it is difficult to identify the source and quantity of missile supplies. 2

In addition to the very high production level of the ‘Scud’ missiles, a myriad of variations and additions exist for the ‘Scud’ platform. Several different warheads were developed for the ‘Scud B’ missiles including nuclear yields between 5 and 70 kT, chemical agents, and conventional high explosives.

The Iranian Shahab 1 is 10.94 m long, 0.88 m in diameter and has a launch weight of 5860 kg, with a minimum range of 50 km and a maximum range of 300 km (186 miles). It has an accuracy of 450 m CEP. 3 These specifications are nearly identical to the North Korean ‘Scud B’ variant, which is unsurprising as many (if not most) Shahab 1 missiles were probably built by North Korea and delivered to Iran. Even as Iran has developed the ability to indigenously produce missiles (also with North Korean assistance), many of the components are still believed to be imported from North Korea. 4

The Iranian involvement with the ‘Scud’ missile is significant, both in terms of domestic Iranian missile development and in terms of missiles available on the export market. The Iranian government is reported to have made its first test launch of a domestically-built ballistic missile in 1988, which was believed to be a ‘Scud B’ variant with a range of 300 km (186 miles) and a payload of 985 kg, developed with the assistance of either North Korea or the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 5

The weapon system was publicly tested again in 1998 in the Caspian Sea. This test is very important to the study of Iran’s ballistic missile program. The Shahab 1 that was tested in the Caspian was launched from a TEL aboard a commercial vessel. This constitutes a different kind of missile threat to the United States and coastal range countries. The ‘Scud’ then has the possibility of being covertly brought adjacent to a coastline and launched without notice. Then, as quickly as the weapon fired, it could return to covert status. This method of delivery brings the weapon in closer range, which improves its accuracy, and decreases its chance of being spotted by radar. Due to the flight time of the missile, it could be delivered without major radar signal. 6

After the Iran-Iraq War, Iran continued to fire Shahab 1 missiles. Four missiles were fired from Iran into Iraq at what was classified as a guerilla base in 1994. In 1999, reports indicate eight missiles were fired at targets in Iraq between April and November.

In 2001, reports indicate that nearly 70 missiles of varying class and designation were fired into Iraq from Iran. Iran is reported to have purchased a number of Syrian and 120 North Korean ‘Scud B’ missiles. United States Air Force reports from 1996 indicate that number could be in the 200s. Also, the same report implicates North Korea in the sale of approximately 170 ‘Scud C’ missiles to Iran. The precise number of these missiles, however, is quite uncertain. Several factors contribute to the uncertainty of Iran’s arsenal. Iran tends to be extremely secretive and often re-designates systems without warning or notification. Also, Iran has several production facilities which build their own variants of the original systems purchased from North Korea or China. Therefore, the exact numbers of domestically produced, and foreign bought missile systems is unclear.

Reports confirm that Iran has the capability of producing these weapons in great quantity. Their major contracts for these particular missile systems have been given to Iran Aerospace Industries (IAI). Reports indicate with some certainty that due to the amount of weapons displayed, used, and available for operation, that IAI has the capability of producing these weapons in quantities necessary for domestic and export use. Further reports indicate that Iran has the ability to manufacture North Korean ‘Scud C’ variants with a range of 500 km (342 miles) and a payload of 770 kg. 7

 

[UAE]

SHAHAB 2 (‘SCUD C’ VARIANT)
Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Alternate Name:Qiam, SS-1D 'Scud' C variant
Class:Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
Basing:Road-mobile
Length:10.94 or 11.5 m
Diameter:0.88 m
Launch Weight:6,095 kg
Payload:770 kg
Warhead:HE or submunitions
Propulsion:Liquid propellant
Range:500 kg
Status:Operational
In Service:1997
The Shahab 2 is the Iranian variant of the Russian SS-1D ‘Scud C’. It is a single-stage, liquid-propelled, short-range ballistic missile. Its maximum range is 500 km and it carries a single warhead with the maximum payload of 770 kg.

The length of the Shahab 2 is disputed. Most believe it is 10.94 m, although one report states a length of 11.25 m. The diameter is 0.88 m and the launch weight is 6,095 kg. This missile presumably carries HE, chemical and nuclear warheads, though only HE warheads are known to exist. Reports show that 170 missiles were assembled following the initial test launch trials in 1991.

Preliminary reports from Iran in 1997 discuss the possibility of coastal batteries for the Shahab 2. The Shahab 2 was again tested in July 1998 following its introduction into service in 1997. In 2004, the Shahab 2 became an active participant in all military drills and exercises, being consistently tested with successful results. An additional public test in April 2006 signaled the beginning of a regional war game. The last noted successful test was in November of 2006, where the Shahab 2 employed a submunitions warhead. There is a great deal of public relations information from Iran stating that the purpose of these ballistic weapons is for defense only.

Reports indicate that Iran assisted in the construction of several countries weapons programs including Congo and Sudan. Syria, in turn, may have been aided by Iran in building the Syrian ‘Scud C’. A 2006 report suggested that Iran was negotiating to export Shahab 2 missiles to Venezuela. Another 2006 report suggested the presence of 300 to 400 operational Shahab 1 and 2 missiles in Iran.

An improved Shahab 2 variant, Qiam 1, was tested August 10, 2010. The Qiam 1 is very similar to the Shahab 2, but it has a triconic shaped reentry vehicle, heavier launch weight (6,155 kg), smaller payload (750 kg), longer range (800 kg), and enhanced accuracy (500 CEP). 1

 

[UAE]

SHAHAB 3
Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Alternate Name:Shihab 3, Shehob 3
Class:Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
Basing:Road-mobile
Length:16.58 m
Diameter:1.25 or 1.38 m
Launch Weight:17,410 kg
Payload:Single warhead, 1,200 kg
Warhead:Nuclear, HE, chemical, or submunitions
Propulsion:Single-stage liquid propellant
Range:1,300 kg
Status:Operational
In Service:2003
The Shahab 3 is a medium-range, liquid-propellant, road-mobile ballistic missile. The Shahab 3 represents Iran’s first successful attempt to acquire medium-range ballistic missiles that give it the capability to threaten targets (like Israel) which lie beyond its immediate borders. The original Shahab 3 missile is nearly identical to the North Korean No Dong 1 missile, and almost certainly is based on technology and parts from North Korea. Pakistan has also shared in this technology to build the Hatf 5 missile. North Korea, a country that has long supplied Iran with missiles and missile technology, began development of the No Dong 1 in the mid-1980s. Neither North Korea, nor Iran, nor Pakistan had well-developed missile programs at the time, so it is believed that the original technology came from either Russia or China. It seems likely that the North Koreans borrowed engine designs from the Russian SS-3 (R-5) missile, though the No Dong missile is significantly smaller. 1 The connection to the Russian missile seems likely for two reasons: First, Russia has been known to declassify obsolete missile designs, thus allowing them to fall into other hands. Second, the No Dong missile is believed to use the same fuel and oxidizer as many Russian missiles. Regardless of where the technology came from, the North Koreans almost certainly did not build the missile without some outside guidance, as their limited experience would have required far more initial testing than is believed to have been conducted. Moreover, both Iran and Pakistan invested in the North Korean technology prior to much testing – a move that they probably would not have made if the success of the technology was uncertain. 2

Shahab 3 on transporter vehicle, 1999.
Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems

Both the No Dong missile and the Shahab 3 missile look much like an over-sized ‘Scud’ missile; however, later missiles represent some major departures that are important from technology and performance perspectives. 3 On the technology side, the missiles use an engine that is similar, but larger than that used on the ‘Scud’ missiles. This fact is important because North Korea’s prior experience was almost entirely gained by modifying – not redesigning – ‘Scud’ engines. From a performance perspective, the increased size allows for a significantly increased range without making a missile that is too large for TEL-basing. While using a single-stage liquid propellant engine (like a ‘Scud’), the No Dong and the Shahab 3 employ a separating RV unit. The ability to build a two-stage missile (engine + re-entry vehicle) is potentially a significant intermediate step between short-range, low payload missiles (like ‘Scuds’) and much longer-range, heavier payload missiles.

Testing began on the No Dong missiles in 1990. In 1993, it is believed that Iran and Pakistan entered into an agreement with North Korea to buy missiles and/or share the technology. At least one No Dong missile was tested in 1993, and Iran and Pakistan likely sent representatives to witness the test. While Iran initially purchased a great number of the No Dong missiles, international pressure seems to have led to the transfer of only a few missiles. In 1997, engine testing on the Shahab 3 began in Iran, presumably with a small number of No Dong missiles or missile components from North Korea. 4

The abilities and specifications of the Shahab 3 are largely based upon foreign speculation and aggressive Iranian diplomacy. Iran is known to rename missile programs, exaggerate about missile performance abilities, and declare that untested technologies are operational. To further complicate the problem, it is frequently unclear which versions of the Shahab 3 are referred to by Iranian officials and western intelligence reports. Contrasting reports suggest that the missile is between 15.6 and 16.58 m in length and 1.25 and 1.38 m in diameter. These same reports place the range between 800 and 1,300 km with payloads varying between 760 and 1,200 kg. 5 The range is likely about 1000 km, but varies widely depending upon the weight of the payload. Heavier and more effective payloads, like those employing first-generation nuclear warheads, would likely have a much shorter range than a smaller unitary HE warhead. The total launch weight is about 17,410 kg.

Most sources suggest that the guidance system of the Shahab 3 is based upon the inertial system used in the ‘Scud’ missiles, giving the missile an accuracy of about 2,500 m CEP. The Pakistani version, the Hatf 5, is believed to employ Chinese guidance technology that significantly improves accuracy. 6 The Shahab 3 may use similar technology, especially in its later variants, but early versions of the missile likely had very poor accuracy. With an accuracy of 2,500 m CEP, the Shahab 3 missile is primarily effective against large, soft targets (like cities).

Warhead options may include biological and chemical weapons, but as ballistic missiles are an expensive and not highly effective method of deploying chemical and biological agents, Iran would presumably favor nuclear or HE warheads for the Shahab 3. 7 Iran’s nuclear ambitions are no secret, though it is not yet known whether Iran has successfully acquired or built nuclear warheads. The Sha

 

[UAE]

SHAHAB 3 VARIANTS
Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Alternate Name:Shahab 3A, Shahab 3B, Ghadr-1
Class:Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
Basing:Road-mobile
Length:17.0 m
Diameter:1.25 or 1.38 m
Launch Weight:18,300-19,000 kg
Payload:800 kg
Warhead:Nuclear, chemical, HE, submunitions
Propulsion:Single-stage liquid propellant
Range:1,500-2,500 kg
Status:Operational
In Service:2007
Iran has developed a number of variants to the original Shahab 3 missile. These have been referred to by various intelligence and media sources as the Shahab 3A, Shahab 3B, Shahab 3D, Shahab 3M, Ghadr-1, and Qadr-1. The Shahab 3 has also been used as the basis for an Iranian space program, and these rockets have been called Kavoshgar-1, IRIS, and Safir.

The lack of reliable information, especially when combined with the confusing list of alternate names, has made the separate specifications for the Shahab 3 variants almost impossible to sort out. The existence of variants has been confirmed by photos and test launches of externally modified Shahab 3 missiles, but which project/missile name belongs to each specific modification is less clear.

Based upon known tests and photographs, the Shahab 3 has undergone the following modifications: 1

• Size reduction of rear fins.
• Material replacement of fuselage (aluminum in place of steel) to reduce weight.
• Overall reduction of warhead mass.
• Lengthening of airframe to allow for longer fuel tanks (and additional fuel).
• Replacement of navigation and guidance systems.
• Redesign of the RV/warhead unit, giving the nose cone a “baby bottle” shape that allows for a higher re-entry velocity and possibly an air-burst detonation (necessary for EMP).

Known and supposed modifications have led experts to suggest that the newer missiles have a range of 1,500 to 1,800 km. 2 Some sources suggest that later versions are capable of reaching 2,500 km. 3 Of course, the additional range bears a heavy cost on payload, and most experts place the maximum payload of Shahab 3 variants around 800 kg. 4 Given RV design requirements, an 800 kg payload could be expected to carry a 500 kg warhead. The combination of reduced fuselage weight and increased fuel capacity provide the Shahab 3 variants with about the same launch weight as the original Shahab 3. The increased fuel may increase overall launch weight by as much as 1,000 kg, but the extra ten seconds or so of burn-time give the missile a significantly increased range. 5

The original Shahab 3 had a separating RV-unit that gave the missile a standard, conical nose cone. The Shahab 3 variants employ a modified RV that gives the missiles a baby bottle-shaped nose cone. More exactly, the RV consists of a small cone attached to a cylinder that connects to the body of the missile (the single stage engine) with metal skirting.

The new design is probably capable of faster re-entry speeds, thus making it more difficult to target with anti-ballistic missile systems. The changed design may also make it possible for the warhead to detonate high above a target. 6 Though an airburst detonation may improve a ballistic missile’s ability to disburse chemical or biological weapons, its most effective use is with a nuclear warhead. A nuclear warhead, when detonated high in the atmosphere, creates an EMP that is potentially more devastating than a conventionally employed nuclear warhead.

Some reports have suggested that the newest variants of the Shahab 3 employ solid fuel.7 Such a modification would represent a great improvement to the overall Shahab 3 program and an incredible development in Iranian missile technology. Solid fuel allows missiles to be stored and transported while fully-fueled and ready to launch; thus the missiles can be quickly and easily launched. Less secure launch locations – on the border of Iran and Iraq, for example – also become more feasible as the decreased launch time lessens the time that a launch crew is vulnerable to enemy fire. Since a solid-fuelled missile requires no pre-launch fueling, the size of a launch crew is also greatly reduced, as fuelling vehicles and fire-safety equipment are no longer necessary.

The Shahab 3 missiles were tested in July 2002, August 2002, and July 2003 may have been Shahab 3 variants. Since that time, Shahab 3 variants have been tested in August 2004, September 2004, October 2004, January 2006, March 2006 (possible), May 2006, and November 2006. 8 It is believed that the earliest Shahab 3 variants reached operational status in 2007. The Iranian space program, which appears to use Shahab 3 missiles or Shahab 3 technology, tested rockets in February 2007 (probably a failure), February 2008, and August 2008. In February 2009, Iran successfully placed a satellite in space aboard the Safir-1. Though the space program represents significant advances in the Iranian program, the rocket used in the 2009 launch is not capable of delivering a warhead at ICBM range (unlike the Russian rocket used to put Sputnik in space). 9

The modifications made to the Shahab 3 are a huge step in the development and independence of the Iranian missile program. Whereas earlier Iranian missile developments could usually be traced to foreign sources, the modifications to the Shahab 3 appear to be domestic technologies. The progress of the Shahab 3, from the mid-1990s to the present, represents the progress of Iranian missile independence and the growing international threat of Iranian aspirations. In the mid-1990s, Iran was building modified ‘Scud’ missiles with foreign assistance; in 2009, Iran successfully launched a satellite on a domestically-built rocket. The future of the Iranian program, in the Shahab 5 and 6, could extend their missile range into Europe.

 

[UAE]

SHAHAB 4

Originated From:Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Class:Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
Warhead:HE, chemical, nuclear
Range:2000 to <4000 km
Status:Unknown
The Shahab 4 has been mentioned in many media and intelligence reports over the last ten years. Unfortunately, those reports have frequently been contradictory and their sum does not provide a clear picture of the Shahab 4 missile project. The program, in fact, may not actually exist. Assuming that the missile is in development, it would probably borrow from the technologies of the Shahab 3 while improving performance characteristics to allow for greater range, a heavier payload, and increased accuracy.

Though Iranian missile development has progressed dramatically in the last 15 years, many experts believe that the Shahab 4 borrows from foreign missile design. In keeping with the North Korea-Pakistan-Iran missile relationship, some speculate that the Shahab 4 is based off of the North Korean No Dong 2 or Taepo Dong 1 missiles or the Pakistani Hatf 5A. Other sources suggest that the Shahab 4 is based on defunct Russian technology from the SS-4 or SS-N-6. 1

The No Dong 2 and the Hatf 5A are obvious comparisons with the Shahab 4. The Shahab 3 was based upon the same technology as the No Dong 1 and the Hatf 5, so it makes some sense that the improved versions of those missiles would form the basis of the newer Shahab missile. Of course, Iran has already greatly improved upon the Shahab 3, as discussed in the Shahab 3 variants entry. If the Shahab 4 is based upon the No Dong 2 and Hatf 5A, then it is probably one of the many Shahab 3 variants and not a separate project. Given the tendency of Iranian officials to name and rename projects, this conclusion is likely accurate.

The SS-4 was 22.8 m long with a diameter of 1.65 m and a launch weight of 42,000 kg. Its 1,600 kg payload contained a single separating warhead. It used a single-stage liquid propellant engine and an inertial guidance system. The SS-4 had a range of 2,000 km (1,243 miles) and an abysmal accuracy of 2,400 m CEP. Depending on the similarity between the Shahab 4 and the SS-4, these figures may not be relevant. It is believed that the Shahab 4 will have an accuracy of between 2,500 and 3,500 m CEP and a range of between 2,000 and 3,000 km (1,243 to 1,864 miles). 2

The Soviet SS-N-6 bears similar specifications to the SS-4 and the projected specifications for Shahab 4, but with increased accuracy (1,000m CEP), greater range (2,500-4,000 km), and a lighter payload (1,200kg). Originally submarine launched, the SS-N-6 is believed to have been modified by North Korean, and finally adjusted and assembled by Iran for use as a land-based missile. At the fall of the Soviet Union, many of these SLBMs remained in operational condition. Reports indicate that one or more of these weapons made their way to North Korea before North Korea delivered some of these missiles to Iran. 3

In 2003 Iran announced that it would close the Shahab 4 program in favor of an SLV program (Satellite Launch Vehicle). 4 Since that time, Iran has had some success with a domestic space program that has successfully put a small satellite into orbit. Regardless of the space program, however, talk of a Shahab 4 has not completely quieted and many believe that a missile with this designator is still in development. The Shahab 3 and its variants can hardly meet many conceivable range and payload objectives, so it seems reasonable to expect that a new missile is in development.

If the Shahab 4’s reported range of 2,000 km range is correct, the missile will have the capability to target all of Israel, as well as Turkey, much of India, and US forces stationed in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Persian Gulf. The missile could substantially increase the political and military leverage held by the Iranian government, especially if Iran develops a nuclear warhead.

An additional threat is the possibility that Iran will give or sell its missile technology to rogue nations or terrorist organizations antagonistic toward the U.S. At present, Iran’s missiles are stored and operated in underground sites under the complete control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which enjoys little outside supervision within Iran. General Mahmud Chahar Baghi of the IRGC stated in 2008 that any act of Israeli aggression would be retorted by the launching of 11,000 missiles within the first minute.5

The Iranian missile program has been shrouded in secrecy, deception, and the unknown. Iran obtains weapons of various design and origin, and frequently retains a single name and reclassifies its physical missile assets, which adds to the confusion. According to Defense Minister Najjar, when asked about the testing of the Shahab 4, “Names and titles are not important in this regard. The important point, though, is that we are proceeding according to our defense doctrine…” 6 At present the future of the Iranian missile program is uncertain, but the existence of these missiles proves that ballistic missiles are no longer the purview of first world nations. If the US and its allies are to remain safe, they must deploy missile defense systems capable of undermining the effectiveness of these now ubiquitous offensive systems.

 

[UAE]

TONDAR 69
People's Republic of China (PRC)
Possessed By:Iran
Class:Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
Basing:Road-mobile
Length:10.8 m
Diameter:0.65 (first), .5 (second)
Launch Weight:2,650 kg
Payload:Single warhead, 250 kg
Warhead:HE
Propulsion:Two-stage solid propellant
Range:150 km
Status:Operational
In Service:1992
In 1989, Iran reportedly purchased 200 M-7 (CSS-8) SRBMs with transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) from China. They renamed this system Tondar 69. The M-7 was originally designed from the Soviet S-75 surface-to-air missile (SAM). The Chinese modified the Soviet SAM under project 8610 and M-7 (export version). The Tondar 69 entered into service in 1992, and a 2009 report indicates it may become obsolete soon. Only 20 TEL vehicles remain in service, which means less than 100 missiles are operational.

The Tondar 69 has a length of 10.8 m, a body diameter of 0.65 (first-stage)/.5 m (second-stage), and a launch weight of 2,650 kg. The missile carries a single HE warhead of 250 kg. The Tondar 69 has a maximum range of a 150 km, and is propelled by a two-stage solid. The guidance is inertial with command updates. 1

​

 

[Scorpion]

Iran SSM (Surface to Surface Missile) Sejil 2 ballistic missile

 

[Scorpion]

Iran Hormuz's anti radars and anti ships ballistic missiles

 

[Scorpion]

 

[Khafee]

Iran Unveils New Zolfaghar Missile

The Iranian military has displayed its Zolfaghar missile, a new variant that marks a major development in the country’s missile technology.

The Zolfaghar, literally "spine-cleaver," is a short-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile belonging to the Fateh-110 family that was put on display December 16 at the Amirkabir University of Technology in Iran, according to the Fars News Agency. The missile's name is sometimes spelled Zulfiqar.

The missile is reported to have a range of more than 700 kilometers, according to IHS Jane's, and to be accurate within 50 to 70 meters of its intended strike location, according to the Iranian news outlet. Previous generations of Fateh missiles have only traveled 500 kilometers.


Tasnim, another Iranian news source, said in June that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps had fired a volley of Zolfaghar missiles at Daesh positions in Deir Ez-Zor, Syria. Iranian media showed videos of the missiles launching as well as aerial footage of the projectiles striking targets. The aerial view was reported to have been collected by IRGC drones operating out of Damascus.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Missile Defense Project, the Zolfaghar packs a highly explosive warhead as well as submunitions that separate from the missile prior to impact. Cluster munitions also make use of submunitions.


https://sputniknews.com/military/201712211060186192-iran-unveils-powerful-zolfaghar-missile/