Lockheed Martin (LM) CSC Type 26 Frigate Design | Page 13 | World Defense

Lockheed Martin (LM) CSC Type 26 Frigate Design

GRANNY001

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Hi folks. Here is an update of weapons & systems the CSC Type 26 Frigate known so far:

1. 1 X LM Solid State 3D Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) "S" Band Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR)-SPY 7 (V) 1 Phased Array Air Search Radar-Confirmed by Lockheed Martin (LM).
2. 1 X Solid State AESA "X" Band Illumination Radar supported by MacDonald Dettwiller Associates (MDA) in Richmond British Columbia-below the SPY 7 radar mast, with integration into the CMS 330 system-this may be an MDA built radar or IMO it may be an existing radar from Thales (possibly the Sea Fire 500 AESA Phased Array Radar) however MDA is not talking. Any enlightenment on this radar from any forum members, would be appreciated.
3. "X" & "S" Bands Navigation Radars
4. MacDonald Dettwiller Associates (MDA)-Electronic Warfare Suite System & Chaff launchers
5. MacDonald Dettwiller Associates (MDA)-Laser Warfare Defence System (again MDA is not talking).
6. 32 x MK 41 strike length VLS-ESSM2, SM II/IIIC-SM3/6 (fitted for, but not with); Raytheon Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles (TLAM).
7. Combat Information Management Systems-Links 11/16/22/GCCS-M/ Mode 5S Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
8. Light Weight (LW) MK 54 Torpedo system with twin launcher tubes
9. Sea Spider anti-torpedo system (Magellan/TKMS)
10. 6 x 4 ExLS VLS-Aft of the funnel (Sea Ceptor, quad-packed) for CIADS
11. 2 x 4 Quad packs Kongsberg NSM-Port/Stbd Above Mission Bay.
12. Main Gun: 1 x 5 inch Leonardo Oto Melara 127mm Light Weight (LW) Land Attack and Anti-Air Vulcano gun. This gun will confer the CSC ships with the ability to fire extended-range, precision-guided Vulcano munitions – both in guided long-range and the ballistic extended-range versions – and conventional ammunition.
13. Secondary Guns: 2 x 30mm DMS 30 (Bushmaster 30mm) Stabilized Rapid Fire 30mm Naval Gun Systems from BAE -(Port/Stbd of Flight Deck)
14. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) Sensor Netting-Integrated Cyber Defence System; Integrated Bridge & Navigation System from OSI
15. Internal/External Communications Suite-HF/UHF/SHF/VHF/SATCOM from L3 Harris.
16. Electro Optical & Infrared Systems; Radio/Radar Electronic Support Measures (ESM) to include: Frequency Identification; Laser Warning & Countermeasures System; Radar/Radio Frequency Electronic Jammers; Electronic Decoy Systems.
17 CMS: Lockheed Martin CMS 330/Aegis Combat System (ACS) in support of Co-operative Engagement Capability (CEC).
18. Ultra Electronics Hull Mounted Sonar (HMS)-Ultra S2150.
19. Ultra Electronics Active/Passive Towed Array Sonar; Towed Torpedo Countermeasures-Sea Sentor S21700.
20. Sonobouy Processing System from General Dynamics with expendable Acoustic Countermeasures.
21. Combined Diesel Electric Gas Turbine (CODLOG) Propulsion System to include 1 X Rolls Royce RR/MT 30 Gas Turbine; 2 X Electronic Motors from General Electric; 4 X RR MTU Diesel Generators; Integrated Platform Management System from L3 Harris.
22. CH 148 Cyclone Sikorsky (S-92) ASW Helicopter; SKELDAR V200 UAV systems from Saab-known as CU-176 "Gargoyle"
23. Speed-approximately 27-30 kts. Statement Of Requirement (SOR) required this capability for US Carrier Battle Group (CBG) Ops.
24. Crew Compliment-204 max crew (fitted with separate female quarters)
If any member can add or subtract anything from this list, please let me know.
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GRANNY001

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It has been reported by the UK Defence Journal (see link below) that the first Type 26 Frigate (HMS Glasgow) will enter service 12 months sooner than anticipated. The British Type 26 program team reported in March 2021 that it forecasts achieving the in-service date for ship one (HMS Glasgow) 12 months sooner than planned or forecasted at the time of going on contract. This seems to give the CSC Type 26 Frigate program some hope to at least accomplish the same build time for it's program as well once our build starts. As it stands now the CSC Frigate program is almost 2 yrs behind schedule and does not seem to be gaining any ground. Another reason for the government/Irving Shipyard to quickly finish the CSC Frigate design phase soonest, quickly sign the contract with Lockheed Martin for the first batch as soon as possible.

 

GRANNY001

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The RCN has finally kicked off the long anticipated report to replace Canada's Victoria class submarines today-14 July 2021. Some would say, too little, too late but the first baby steps have now been taken in this controversial debate. The CAF is establishing a Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) this year to advise the government on potential replacement classes of submarines to avoid gaps in submarine capability.

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GRANNY001

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I believe we have 5 options here in Canada. Nuclear subs-Astute/Virginia class (That will never happen!); The French AIP Barracuda Block 1A class (A good possibility); The Japanese LIB AIP Soryu 29ss class (Another great option); Perhaps even the German Type 216 long range AIP sub (another good option) or scrap the submarine service entirely (The Canadian people would never stand for that!). Lets just let the process find its way for the RCN, and leave the politics out of it (for now)!
 

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Canadian Shipbuilding-Budgets Can Sink Warships

An opinion article from the writer only and not to be published anywhere but this forum.

Recent Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) and Auditor General (AG) reports into Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) paint a challenging picture for a multi-decade effort to build 52 large ships for both the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Canadian Coast Guard (CCG). The near consensus response from national skeptics is to “throw in the towel”, and accept that Canada will never be able to provide meaningful defence procurement strategies. “Abandoning Ship” and opting for an overseas buy and build may certainly seem tempting, but beware: modern naval shipbuilding is far more complex and expensive than meets the eye. What may seem like a bargain, rarely ever is. Instead, the decision to build a fleet at home or abroad comes with trade-offs, of which cost is just one.

Strategically, Canada is at best, a maritime middle power. Although often forgotten in central Canada, Ottawa presides over the world’s longest coastline, second largest continental shelf, and fifth largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) containing vast sea life and seemingly unlimited natural resources. To the north, the impact of melting sea ice, a global resource hunt, and tensions between the U.S., Russia and China are transforming the Canadian Arctic into a “geopolitical quagmire”. In the North Atlantic, Russian submarine activities are at post-Cold War highs. In the Indo-Pacific region, the site of growing Canadian trade and political ties, sees a Sino-American rivalry criss-crossing the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, all amid a regional submarine arms race, and anti-ship/Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) build-up. It would be ideal if there were an off-the-shelf warship Canada could acquire, ready-made for naval service in such a challenging global operational environment, but this is not the case. Foreign countries build ships to meet their own operational demands. German submarines such as the Type 212CD AIP submarine are designed for short range missions in shallow Baltic and Mediterranean waters. Likewise, the British Type-26 frigate is one of several warship types being built for protecting the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers and nuclear ballistic guided missile submarines.

Canada’s decision to adopt the Type-26 design for the CSC project envisions a more expansive and ambitious role. Meant to last for nearly 4-5 decades, the CSC will be the sole true warship for Canada well into this century. It adds new capabilities to deal with global tensions (i.e., Tomahawk cruise missiles) and replicates both Iroquois class destroyers (area air warfare-AAW) and Halifax class frigates (anti-submarine warfare-ASW) capabilities. Fitting these Canadian requirements into the British design has consumed costly time and money, but Canada is left with a CSC Type-26 frigate attuned to its needs now and in the future. The NSS’s 30-year approach of continuous shipbuilding to avoid “boom and bust” cycles may be new, but building Canadian warships, to Canadian standards and in Canadian yards is now a fact of life. Except for submarines and aircraft carriers, it has been official bi-partisan policy to build Canada’s large naval ships domestically. The desire to build local is hardly a Canadian preoccupation. All G7 nations have naval shipbuilding programs, as do smaller and mid-size allied powers.

Finally, building in Canada has other ancillary benefits. In a time of economic nationalism, domestic shipbuilding minimizes both the risk to rely on foreign supply chains and operational disruptions/costs from sending fleets overseas for major maintenance periods. The knowledge gained from building the Halifax class frigates paid off when it came to completing the equally technically challenging and costly refits here in Canada. The NSS is far from perfect, but neither are there easy or cheaper options. If we are serious about tackling international security threats, upholding global norms, advancing our Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) efforts, managing super-power tensions, and defending our own sovereignty, we had better be prepared to pay the price no matter what the cost.
 

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GRANNY001

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GRANNY001

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Bucking The Allied Frigate Trend
“This is an opinion piece by the author for promotion of general discussions by forum members only and not to be published in whole or in part by any other media”.

Ottawa seems to be going against allied cost-reduction trends in putting all its “surface warship eggs” in one, large, expensive CSC Type 26 design basket. Herein lies the quality versus quantity debate concerning naval fleets. The impulse toward a capable, general-purpose fleet is understandable. When you cannot afford a large number of smaller, purpose-built warships, then you try to load as much flexibility and versatility into the limited number of larger platforms you build. Canada has made the case that, by planning to take care of the most demanding missions first, then other roles generally would be covered off as well. The most onerous missions require a fairly large, well-armed, general-purpose surface ship.

Canada's problem is that we tend to procure low-to-middle capability ships, but with a high-end price tag. In terms of capability, the DDH-280 destroyers were an exception with their area air-defence weapons, but even the Halifax-class frigates which followed them were primarily anti-submarine warfare platforms, but with higher general-purpose versatilities added in. At the same time, each ship class cost much more than anticipated- some being labeled “Cadillacs” of their day. The result was that Canada systematically priced itself out of an affordable and effective navy. Canada is not alone with this trend. Even the United States is experiencing the affordability squeeze on its naval force posture as is the United Kingdom. Driven by budget constraints, the USN is divesting some of its larger, high-value naval assets in favour of more mid-sized, lower-end ships. US Navy officials support the idea of shifting the USN’s surface combatant force to a more reduced proportion of large surface ships (cruisers and destroyers), an increased percentage of small surface ships (frigates and littoral combat ships), and a new third tier of unmanned surface vehicles. The current FFG(X) frigate program is a prime example of this trend for the USN. The UK also appears to be following the same trend, with its larger Type 26 frigate being backed up with smaller, less capable Type 31 ships as part of their own National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS).

In Canada, the cost of new warships continues to escalate, but is our navy getting better, more capable warships? The current CSC Requirements Reconciliation and Design process will determine how much capability Ottawa is willing to pay for. The NSS appears to prefer incentive contracting with target price ceilings. These ceilings have thus far not done much to curb cost growth on the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and the Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels. In any event, it is a good bet that Canada’s variant of the BAE Type 26 Global Combat Ship may be significantly more capable than either the UK or Australian variants.

Ottawa seems to be putting most of its warship “eggs in one basket,” but only because it has to. In my opinion (IMO), not only does Canada not have the financial ability to produce more of these ‘cadillacs’ but it could not man them even if we had the where-with-all. The CSC Frigate, at almost 8000 tonnes, is not a low-to-middle class capability, but a very high-end 5th generation warship with growth potential for the future. This is a "Rolls Royce" of ships which may very well out-perform both the British City and Australian Hunter class Global Combat Ships (GCS). Canada’s reality is that it must produce a very capable warship because we are forced to do more with less due to our geography, environment, mission requirements and defence budget. The CSCs SPY 7 (V) 1 radar system has already been fully developed by Lockheed Martin (LM) with characteristics that are now more capable than the Arleigh Burke SPY 1 family of radars and may rival the SPY 6 AMDR radar system now scheduled to be fitted on the Arleigh Burke Flt III destroyers. The USN FFX (based on the Italian FREMM class) is a mid-sized frigate, but not “low-end” by any means as well.

At the end of the day, will Canada’s CSC be more capable than say a 9,500 tonne Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer? The answer is, probably not. But is Ottawa willing to pay nearly double the price for a single CSC frigate? Increasing costs per ship doesn’t necessarily reflect better quality. It may only be an indicator of the greater expense involved in Ottawa’s ‘build-in-Canada’ policy. Perhaps one reason Canada has concluded that a small number of mid-sized, very capable, general-purpose warships are preferred over significantly greater numbers of much smaller, more specialized warships comes down to the fact that smaller never equates to cheaper under Ottawa’s ponderously slow, multi-layered, and always expensive defence procurement system. So why try to buck the trend?

The CSC Type Frigate, as so far designed, is a very high-end and capable Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) warship with a combined AAW, ASW and ASuW capability. The first batch of CSC frigates will be AAW orientated, able to take on this roll with weapons like SM-2 Block IIIC with possible growth for the SM-3/6 systems, ESSM missile systems , Tomahawk Long Range Cruise Missiles in its MK 41 VLS, along with an improved Naval Surface Missile (NSM) and Close In Air Defence Missile System (CAAMS). The inclusion of the Leonardo 5” 127mm naval gun for Naval Gunfire Support with the ability to strike with guided and Anti-Air munitions is a much better choice for Canada, than the American 5” MK 45 Mod 4 gun to be fitted on the Hunter and City class frigates. LMs SPY 7 V (1) AESA radar along with a new and improved CCMS 330 Combat System, also by LM, will be key components to all of this. You cannot, and should not compare apples to oranges with the Arleigh Burke destroyers and CSC frigates, but IMO in terms of Aegis platforms, the CSC can more than hold its own, and will be the back-bone of the RCN for this century. Yes, Canada is “bucking the trend”, however Canada will have a much more capable navy because of it.
 
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